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THE PROPOSED UNIFORM LAW ON
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DISCUSSION OF SOME SPECIAL
AND GENERAL PROBLEMS REFLECTED IN
THE FORM AND CONTENT, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION ARTICLES
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When utilized in international payment transactions, bills of
exchange and promissory notes are currently subject to three competing legal regimes: the United States' Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.); the British Bills of Exchange Act (BEA),I and the Geneva
Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes
(GULB). 2 The existence of multiple systems of law on negotiable
instruments leads inevitably to a lack of uniformity in international
payment transactions.3 Accordingly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 4 at its second ses* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1977; B.S., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton
School), 1973; Associate, Law Offices of William H. Wells, Mt. Holly, New Jersey; Member,
New Jersey and American Bar Associations.
The author was a participant in a special research project at Cornell Law School which
assisted Professor Norman Penney in his work as a member of the ULIB drafting committee.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not be construed to
represent the perceptions or conclusions of Professor Penney or other members of the drafting committee.
1. British Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61 [hereinafter cited as BEA].
2. Convention Providing A Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes,
openedfor signatureJune 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 259, with Annex 1, Uniform Law on Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes, openedfor signatureJune 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter cited as GULB].
3. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of Its Second Session, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No 18) 16-62, U.N. Doc. A/7618 (1969),
reprintedin I Y.B. UNCITRAL 103, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/Ser. A/ 1970 [hereinafter cited as I
UNCITRAL]. The Commission noted that even within the existing law on negotiable instruments, complete uniformity has not been achieved. Id at 103, para. 66. For a summary
of the Commission's observations on the subject of the harmonization and unification of the
law of negotiable instruments, see id paras. 65-81.
4. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly.
G.A. Res. 2205, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), repruiedin 1
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UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 65-66. The work of UNCITRAL is not limited to the law of
international payments. The Commission has addressed a number of far-reaching problems
in the broad realm of international trade. For the General Assembly's statement of the organization and function of UNCITRAL, see I UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 65.
An excellent account of the background of UNCITRAL, and its work on international
bills of exchange and promissory notes, appears in I. MEZNERics, LAW OF BANKING IN
EAST-WEST TRADE 238-51 (1973). Because a thorough understanding of the background of
UNCITRAL is important to the fulfillment of one of the purposes of this article, a rather
extensive reference to Meznerics is in order. The author notes:
Under the pertinent General Assembly Resolution, the object of the Commission is
'the promotion of the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade'.
The Commission consists of twenty-nine State Members of the United Nations. It holds one regular session a year alternatively at United Nations Headquarters in New York and at the United Nations Office at Geneva; during the year
working groups designated by the Commission from among its members meet on
specific topics. Reports of these working groups, reports by the Secretary-General
and studies by Governments and by governmental and non-governmental international organizations active in the field of international trade law are considered by
the Commission at its annual sessions ....
UNCITRAL, at its first session (1967) decided to include in its work programme, as a priority topic, within the wider scope of international trade law, the
law of internationalpayments. Among the items falling within the programme of
harmonization and unification in this field are: (a) the law relating to negotiable
instruments; (b) banker's commercial credits; (c) guarantees and securities.
Discussions on the possibilities of extending the unification of the law of bills
of exchange and cheques were continued at each session of UNCITRAL, the first
discussion taking place on the ground of a report submitted to the Commission by
the InternationalInstituteforthe (nfcation of PrivateLaw (UNIDROIT) (citation
omitted).
The basic problem of unification-as it appears also out of this Document--stems out of the substantial differences. . . between the two main groups of
legislation on bills of exchange and cheques now existing in the civil-law countries
(countries of continental Europe which adopted the Geneva Conventions of 193031), on the one hand, and in the common-law countries on the other. According to
the Geneva Uniform Laws the bill of exchange and the cheque are abstract instruments, the validity of which depends primarily on formal requirements. The obligation arising out of the instrument is entirely independent of the basic or underlying
turidical
relationship on which the issuance or negotiation of the instrument itself is

ased.

In the common-law countries, the formal elements of negotiable instruments
play but a restricted role in deciding their validity and, besides this, statutes must
always be interpreted in the light of the pre-existing common law, so that the judges
in these countries may impose limits on the uniformity introduced by a written law
by using the wide discretionarypowers characteristic of this legal system.
As to the question of the convenience of promoting a wider acceptance of the
Geneva Conventions on negotiable instruments, considering the many differences
based on the fundamental criteria mentioned above.... the opinion---expressed
as early as the second session of UNCITRAL-was almost unanimous, viz. that
any hope of persuading the common-law countries to adopt the Geneva Uniform
Law, .. . is to be set aside and that the problem of international unification with
respect to negotiable instruments should be approached in another way.
After further discussions, the Commission concluded that a solution might lie
in the creation of a new negotiable instrument to be used in international transactions only, and decided to make a further study of the possibility of creating such
an instrument, which should be based upon an inquiry aimed at securing the views
and suggestions of Governments, as well as banking and trade institutions.
To that end the Secretary-General drew up, in consultation with UNIDROIT
and some international banking and trade institutions, a questionnaire designed to
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sion held in Geneva in March 1969,1 concluded that a solution
might lie in the creation of a new negotiable instrument to be used
in international transactions.6 The result is the emergence of a new
proposed Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes (ULIB), which will provide parties to negotiable
instruments in international payment transactions the opportunity
formulated with the
of choosing a multinational treaty obtain factual information on present methods and practices from banking and
other institutions with respect to international payments. A second part of the
questionnaire was designed to identify the nature and cause of any problems encountered in settling international transactions by means of negotiable instruments.
In addition, an annex to the questionnaire contained a number of questions directed to the main points of difference between the common-law and civil-law systems. The questionnaire has been addressed to Governments and to banking and
trade institutions.
At its fourth session of UNCITRAL (1971), most representatives who spoke on
the subject expressed the view that the replies to the Secretary-General's questionnaire had shown that the problems encountered in this area were sufficiently important to justify continuation of work on this subject. Accordingly, the Commission
gave further consideration to the approach it had approved at its previous sessions,
that is, thepreparationof uniform rules applicable to a special negotiable instrument to
be used optionally in international transactions; there was a general agreement that
this approach would provide the most feasible solution to the problems and difficulties in this field of international payments. The essential feature of that approach
was that unification would be confined to payment transactions that were international in character and that, consequently, the opposed uniform rules would not
supercede national laws and practices related to domestic transactions ....
A rough draft of uniform rules (and commentary) on the special negotiable
instrument in question, prepared by the Secretariat of UNCITRAL, had been discussed at a series of meetings, held between 1969 and 1972, with representatives of
interested international organizations, including banking organizations [International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization of American States (OAS), Hague
Conference on Private Law, International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT), International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC), Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
and F6d6ration Banaire des Communaut6s Europ6enes].
As a result of these consultations, a new Draft Uniform Law on International
Bills of Exchange and Commentary (citation omitted) has been submitted by the
Secretariat to the fifth session of UNCITRAL (1972) and at the same session a
small working group consisting of seven members has been established and entrusted with the preparation of a final Draft to the Commission.
MEZNERICS, supra, at 238-44 (original emphasis).
In a series of four annual meetings since 1972, the working group analyzed, discussed,
and revised the 86 articles of the original draft prepared by the Secretariat. At the end of
each working group session, a summary of the deliberations was prepared by the Secretariat
and approved by the working group. In early 1977, the Secretariat prepared a "revised"
draft, see note 21 infra, based on the various additions and deletions made by the working
group over the four year period.
The working group held its fifth session in July, 1977, see note 11 infra. At that session,
the revised draft (articles 1 through 24) were subject to revision. In effect, the working group
has embarked upon the preparation of a third draft of the proposed Treaty.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Id at 243.
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imprimatur of the United Nations bilities on the instrument.

to govern their rights and lia-

The entire proposed Convention, which may be enacted as
early as 1980,' has undergone three successive drafts: a first draft
concluded in 1972;8 a second draft in early 1977; 9 and a third draft
completed in July 1977.0 Although the efforts of the drafting com-

mittee have produced a body of substantive provisions that should
be generally acceptable to the international community, a number
of problem areas remain that deserve the attention of the drafting
committee in its future deliberations on the proposed ULIB.

The purpose of this analysis is threefold. First, it shall examine in detail the substance of Third Draft' ULIB articles 1
through 4, and 6 through 11, while concomitantly examining some
important substantive and procedural problems stemming from
these articles.' 2 These articles deal with three fundamental subject
7. This projection is based on a candid assessment made by Professor Norman Penney
of Cornell Law School - a member of the ULIB drafting party, which is a subcommittee of
the ULIB working group. Professor Penney has predicted that before a final draft ULIB can
be submitted to the Secretariat, three more meetings of the working group and the drafting
party, followed by two more UNCITRAL sessions, and a final "diplomatic conference," will
be required. See Memorandum of Professor Penney to the author (May 3, 1977) (copy on
file with Califormna Western InternationalLaw Journal).
8. See note 22 infra.
9. See note 21 infra.
10. See note 11 infra. It should be noted that the working group did not produce a
complete revision of the Second Draft. The Third Draft currently contains a revision of
articles 1-24 only. See also note 12 infra.
11. International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Draft Report
of the Working Group on International Negotiable Instruments on the Work of Its Fifth
Session (July 18-29, 1977), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.I 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Third Draft ULIB].
12. As discussed supra,note 4, the working group's fifth and subsequent session deliberations must ultimately be approved by a full meeting of UNCITRAL. However, given the
past disinclination of UNCITRAL to alter the working group's proposals, coupled with the
implicit bureaucratic tendency to limit alterations in later sessions, designation of the fifth
and future working group deliberations as the Third Draft ULIB is largely accurate. Indeed,
as things now stand, a major portion of the Third Draft ULIB will undoubtedly be incorporated into the final draft ULIB.
There exists several reasons for limiting the scope of this article to the Third Draft articles 1-4 and 6-11. First, the fifth session of the working group only completed revisions of
articles 1-24 of the Second Draft ULIB; hence, discussion of the subsequent articles is practically precluded. Second, a limited scope will provide a focused and detailed discussion of
the proposed Uniform Law - something which could not be achieved in a discussion of the
entire ULIB. Third, it will allow insight to be gained into the basic process by which ULIB
has been shaped. Fourth, it will at least allow some broad and important questions concerning the entire proposed ULIB, which have not been adequately discussed in the literature
thus far, to be tagged for future debate. Finally, such a limited scope comports with the role
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areas: form and content requirements; 13 choice of law; 4 and judicial interpretation."5 Second, the article proposes to examine some

collateral problems of a broader nature necessarily raised by the
closeup substantive-procedural discussion. Third, an overall assessment of the provisions, processes, and problems surrounding
these ULIB articles will be provided. This evaluation will be made
the author played in a special research project team at Cornell Law School during 1977,
which assisted Professor Norman Penney in his work as a member of the ULIB drafting
party.
For general discussions of prior ULIB drafts and philosophical underpinnings of the
international unification of negotiable instruments law, see Burdick, InternationalBills of
Exchange, 6 ILL. L. REV. 421 (1912); Hudson & Feller, The InternationalUnification of Laws
ConcerningBills ofExchange, 44 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1931); Leary & Husted, An Approach to
Drafting an InternationalCommercial Code and a Modus Operandi Under Present Laws, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 1070 (1949); Yntema, Un!fication of the Laws Respecting Negotiable
Instruments, 4 INT'L L.Q. 178 (1951); 1 UNCITRAL, supra note 3; Alten, UNCITRAL
Work on International Negotiable Instruments (1972) (unpublished thesis available in the
Cornell Law School Library); MEZNERICS, supra note 4, at 238-51; Dohm, Draft Uniform
Law on InternationalBills 0fExchange andInternationalPromissoryNotes, 21 AM. J. COMp.
L. 474 (1973); Note, The Convention on the Uniform Law of InternationalBills ofExchange
andInternationalPromissoryNotes- A Comparisonto the Uniform CommercialCode, 5 GA. J.
INT'L L. 216 (1975).

Examination of the successfully enacted Uniform Law on International Sales provides
interesting analogies to the present unification of negotiable instruments. See generally
Wortley, A Uniform Law on InternationalSales of Goods, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1958);
Honnold, The 1964 Hague Conventionsand Unifform Laws on the InternationalSale ofGoods,
13 AM. J. CoMp. L. 451 (1964); Ellwood, The Hague Uniform Laws Governing the International Sale ofGoods, INT'L & COMp. L.Q. (Supp. 9), 38 (1964); Keyes, Towards a Single Law
Governing the International Sale of Goods-4 Comparative Study, 42 CAL. L. REV. 653
(1964); Nadelmann, The Unform Law on the InternationalSale of Goods: The Conflict of
Laws Imbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 449 (1965); Farnsworth & Nadelmann, Some ProblemsRaised
by the Draft Unform Law on the InternationalSale of Goods, 14 AM. J. CoMp. L. 226 (1965);
I. SZASZ, A UNIFORM LAW ON INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (1976).

For general comparative studies of the existing negotiable instruments laws and examinations of more particular problems in this regard, see Kessler, Levi & Ferguson, Some Aspects ofPayment by Negotiable Instrument: A ComparativeStudy, 45 YALE L.J. 1373 (1936);
Trimble, The Law Merchantand the Letter ofCredit, 61 HARV. L. REV. 981 (1948); Crauford,
Dierences Between the English and the German Law Relating to Negotiable Instruments, 6
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 418 (1975); Grisoli, The Unform Law of Bills of Exchange From the
Standpoint ofAnglo-American Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 289 (1959); Izawa, Sono & Shattuck,
Letters fCredit in Japanese-UnitedStates Trade, 38 WASH. L. REV. 169 (1963); Kozalchyk,
The Legal Nature of the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. COMp. L. 395
(1965); Note, The PromissoryNote in Latin America.A CommercialGuide, 14 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 684 (1965); Comment, Similarities in American and European Negotiable Instruments
Law, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 276 (1966); Cohen, Similaritiesin American and European Negotiable Instruments Law, 84 BANKING L.J. 981 (1967); Rajamayagam, Banking and Bills ofExchange in Malaysia and Singapore, 10 MALAYA L. REV. 79 (1968).
13. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, arts. 1, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11.
14. Id art. 3.
15. Id art. 4.
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in light of the objectives by which the future Treaty should be judged. Since the ULIB will be an "optional" law for parties of signatory and non-signatory nations, this overall assessment will assist
counsel for international banks, international corporations, and
traders in the international marketplace in making recommendations to their clients as to whether the ULIB should be chosen over
a domestic negotiable instruments law.
I.
A.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

Form and Content Requirements

The existence of disharmonious negotiable instrument form
and content requirements among the legal systems of the world undermines a fundamental purpose for the utilization of commercial
paper: merchants, traders, and financial intermediaries require a
clear and concise expression of monetary undertaking which can be
quickly recognized and which facilitates the transfer of trade credits. Both the general and specific replies to that portion of the UNCITRAL questionnaire 6 which dealt with the form and content
requirements of current negotiable instrument laws reflected uncertainty of monetary undertaking when such instruments are used in
international trade. Generally, it was noted that difficulties in interpretation arise where instruments are drawn in accordance with
provisions of the law of the issuing country, but where the instruments' form and content do not conform to the law of the country
of payment.' 7 Specifically, problems of interpreting the monetary
undertaking were said to arise in the following contexts: (1) the effect of statements in the instrument, such as references to an underlying contract; (2) the effect of "not negotiable" written on the
instrument; (3) the effect of deviations from the traditional handwritten signature in drawing, accepting, or endorsing the instrument; (4) the effect of bills of exchange payable by installments; (5)
the effect of the failure to insert the term "bill of exchange" in the
body of the instrument; and, (6) the effect of a stipulation of interest
16. The Commission was of the opinion that any inquiry into the possibility of creating
a new negotiable instrument should be based, in part, upon the views and suggestions of
governments and banking and trade institutions. These inquiries were designed to ascertain
the variety of methods and practices in the world community with respect to making and
receiving international payments. The questionnaire also sought to determine the nature and
scope of problems encountered in settling international transactions by means of negotiable
instruments. For the text of the questionnaire, see 1 UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 250.
17. 1 UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 250.
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on the underlying principal obligation.' 8
Implicitly, UNCITRAL and the ULIB working group assumed that uncertainty of monetary undertaking could be solved
by addressing the general and specific problem areas indicated by
the various responses to the UNCITRAL questionnaire, while "internationalizing" a new negotiable instrument as an obligational
choice. Indeed, the essential feature of the proposed ULIB is the
unique "international" form and content requirements which a
party must be sure are clearly complied with on the face of a bill of
exchange or promissory note. These new and unique form and
content requirements may be denominated.the "international formal aspects." Another set of rules in the proposed ULIB may be
termed "locally analogous form requirements" because of their
similarity to the pre-existing rules of the various municipal laws.
1. InternationalFormalAspects
a. The Labelling Requirement. Article I of the Third Draft
ULIB requires that an international bill of exchange "[c]ontain, in
the text thereof, the words 'international bill of exchange [Convention of . . .. '"'I9 Similarly, article 1 directs that an international
promissory note "[c]ontain, in the text thereof, the words 'international promissory note [Convention of. . .].' "20 At first glance, the
formalism of this "magic word" requirement is suspect. It might be
argued that if the instrument conforms to otherwise traditional requirements of a negotiable instrument, such additional requirements would be superfluous. Upon closer examination, however,
the need for a clear-cut mechanism which affords the opportunity
for autonomous party choice becomes manifest. Without such a
linguistic signal, both businesspersons and courts would face confusion in determining whether the ULIB or a local law should apply.
Further, the requirement of a designation clause in the text of the
international paper makes it impractical for a subsequent holder of
an instrument, not originally brought under the ULIB, to add a
designation clause.
Third Draft ULIB article 1 reflects a major change from the
wording of the two previous ULIB drafts' international labelling
requirements. The two earlier drafts used the words "governed
18. Id
19. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 1(2)(a) & commentary no. 17.
20. Id art. 1(3)(a) & commentary no. 27.
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by,"' 2 1 and "drawn subject to,"22 respectively, as prefatory clauses
to "the Convention of. .... ,,2" The working group felt that use of
language conditioning the underlying agreement of the instrument
would raise potential problems of interpretation under United
States law if the instrument failed to qualify under the ULIB as an
"international instrument," 24 in that the words might be construed
to destroy negotiability pursuant to the "courier without baggage"
principle.2 5 While such a change in wording presents no problems,
it is arguable that the working group overreacted to the United
States' "courier without baggage" principle.

If an American court were to construe an instrument with a
reference "subject to the Convention of" or "governed by the Con-

vention of," the special circumstance of reference to an international treaty would probably induce the court to reason as follows:
the "courier without baggage" principle seeks to separate references

to extrinsic undertakings which may possibly render the promise or
order to pay conditional, from references which only identify the
original undertaking.26 It is reasonable to conclude that references
to particular funds, purchase orders, or contracts would constitute

conditions of payment which should rightly render an instrument
nonnegotiable. Such references entail private affairs - that can be
21. Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Report of the Secretary-General (Jan. 10, 1977), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG. IV/WP.6 (1977),
arts. 1(2)() & (3)() [hereinafter cited as Second Draft ULIB]. The document cited was prepared by the Secretariat on the basis of the deliberations and decisions of the working group
as recorded in its reports on the work of its first four sessions spanning 1972-1976.
22. Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Report of the Secretary-General (Jan. 8, 1973), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.2 (1972), arts.
1(2)(a) & (3)(a) [hereinafter cited as First Draft ULIBI.
23. The reference to "Convention of" indicates the lack of resolution on the part of the
working group of what wording should be required to be placed on the negotiable instrument. Obviously, it would be onerous to require a reference to "Convention of Uniform Law
on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes." Perhaps an acronym reference
"Convention of ULIB" will be adopted.
24. See Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. l(2)(a), commentary nos. 17 & 18.
25. The "courier without baggage" principle was originally articulated in the case of
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846). Under this rule, the holder of a negotiable instrument must be able to determine his rights from the instrument itself; he should not have to
look afield. As articulated by one commentator:
The fact that the terms of payment cannot be determined by looking at the instrument itself, that it is necessary to look to an outside agreement, is contrary to the
concept of negotiability. This is so even though it appears by hindsight that the
outside document, to which the instrument is expressly made subject, contains no
conditions or other provisions that are contrary to the requirements of negotiability.
C. WEBER, COMMERCIAL PAPER 53 (1975).
26. See U.C.C. § 3-105, official comment no. 2 (1972 version).
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expected to vary from case to case - thus affording no reasonable
basis for substantive predictability. However, the denomination
that an instrument is "subject to" or "governed by" an international convention is a reference to a public agreement constituted
by governmental representatives which is characterized by stable
and predictable substantive provisions. Once an initial determination is made that the ULIB is inapplicable because of form and
content deficiencies on the face of an instrument, the "subject to"
and "governed by" references should logically be read out of the
instrument. Further, the U.C.C. provides for a limited number of
special exceptions to the "courier without baggage" principle of negotiability when compelling public policy reasons exist. For instance, the U.C.C. allows an instrument executed by a partnership,
unincorporated association, association, trust, or estate to retain negotiability, and thus fall within the protection of the U.C.C., even
though the obligation is conditioned on payment out of the assets of
the respective entities.2 7 This exception to the "courier without
baggage" principle allows socially desirable associations to issue instruments which exclude the liability of individuals. Another exception within the U.C.C. provides that notes drawn by a
governmental agency are negotiable even though the promise to
pay is limited to and conditioned upon the existence of a particular
fund.2 8 The rationale for this exception is based on sound policy:
government agencies frequently encounter legislative appropriation
directives which mandate that payment be made from a specific
revenue source. By allowing such instruments the status of negotiability, parties' expectancy and reliance interests are upheld while
government operations are facilitated. Thus, ample legal custom
exists for a United States court to extend the public policy exception to the "courier without baggage" principle to a matter involving the vital interests of international trade and commerce.
In the final analysis, however, it seems that the working group
was wise in deleting the reference to "subject to" and "governed
by." While such words would probably not serve to destroy negotiability under the United States' "courier without baggage" principle, such a reference might discourage a favorable judicial
reception of the ULIB. Indeed, the deletion represents recognition
of the turbulent waters of past unification efforts in this area. Im27. U.C.C. § 3-105(h) (1972 version).
28. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-105(l)(g) (1972 version).
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portantly, such a change does not compromise the practical re-

quirement for a signal mechanism that will allow parties to choose
the ULIB as the law governing their monetary transaction.
b. The 'Multinationality" Requirement. The ULIB working
group intended that an international bill of exchange or an international promissory note would, necessarily, be associated with certain characteristics of "internationality." Instead of focusing on the
"international quality of the sale of goods or a test geared to potential conflict of law situations," 9 the "internationality" requirements
of Third Draft ULIB article 1 are philosophically based on the

existence of at least two different national connections appearing on
the instrument.30 Thus, "multinationality" rather than "internationality" is a more precise description of the operation of this requirement under the ULIB.

The multinationality approach is somewhat appealing. Such a
requirement recognizes the reality that individual countries will not
cede their sovereignty over "national" payment transactions, which
are regulated by domestic law. Further, the multinationality approach seems to be more direct and less complicated than a scope
concept tied to international flow of goods 3 1 or a potential conflict
of law standard. Finally, the multinationality approach is theoretically amenable to inclusion of all relevant scope criteria on the face

of an instrument and, thus, comports with the traditional notion of
29. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 1, commentary no. 11.
30. Article I provides:
(2) An international bill of exchange is a written instrument which
shows that at least two of the following places are situated in different
States:
(i) The place indicated next to the name of the drawer or the place of
drawing;
(ii) The place indicated next to the name of the drawee;
(iii) The place indicated next to the name of the payee;
(iv) The place of payment;
(v) The place where the bill was drawn.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. l(2)(e)(i)-(iv) & commentary nos. 23 & 26.
(3) An international promissory note is a written instrument which
(e) Shows that at least two of the following places are situated in different
States:
(i) The place where the instrument was made;
(ii) The place indicated next to the signature of the maker,
(iii) The place indicated next to the name of the payee;
(iv) The place of payment.
Id art. I(3)(eXi)-(iv) & commentary no. 23.
31. This approach would posit a required international "connection" between goods
purchased by a drawer or maker and the payee's place of production of the goods. For
obvious reasons, this approach is manifestly impractical with regard to commercial paper.
(e)

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss1/16

10

Blomquist: The Proposed Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and P
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

a negotiable instrument as a unitary and direct information source
where parties' obligations can be fully and simply ascertained.
On a deeper level, however, the multinationality approach
presents problems of closure. In this regard, Professor Yntema's
early comment is relevant: "it is difficult to see how 'foreign bills'
[can] be formally defined so as to include all bills, and only such, as
circulate in more than one country."3 2 The rub of the problem
seems to be that if one searches hard enough and long enough,
some "multinational" connection is bound to arise in a payment
transaction, whereas, in a contradictory way, most payment transactions have a chain of identifiable domestic connections. A look
at the evolution of the substantive multinationality parameters illustrates the difficulty in adequately defining the scope of the proposed ULIB Treaty.
As originally conceived, the multinationality requirement was
simple and direct. First Draft ULIB article 1 indicated that the
Convention would be applicable only to bills or notes which
showed a place of drawing or making situated in a country other
than the country of the drawee or payee, or the place where payment is to be made.3 3 Thus, the set of relevant "place factors" in the
case of a note was comprised of three interacting elements - place
of making, place of payee, place of contemplated payment - with
three permutations, and four interacting elements - place of
drawer, place of drawee, place of payee, place of contemplated payment - with six permutations, in the case of a bill.
Second Draft ULIB article 1 contains two alternative sets of
multinationality provisions for both bills and notes. One alternative may be described as containing "general face provisions,"
while the other can be usefully characterized as "signature/namespecific" in nature, since the place criteria are required to appear
next to the relevant party's signature. While stylistically different,
32. Yntema, Un#fcation of Laws Respecting Negotiable Instruments, 4 INT'L L.Q. 178,
186 (1951).
33. Article 1 provides:
(2) An international bill of exchange is a written instrument which
Shows that it is drawn in a country other than the country of the drawee
or of the payee or of the place where payment is to be made.
An international promissory note is a written instrument which
(e)

(3)

Shows that it is made in a country other than the country of the payee or
of the place where payment is to be made.
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22.
(e)
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the alternatives were substantively similar.34 In the Second Draft,
the "place factor calculus" for bills of exchange was altered. Under
this revision, the ULIB would be applicable to bills which showed
on their face" a place of drawing - or the place of the drawer 3 1 situated in a country other than the country of the drawee, payee,
or the place where payment is to be made. In addition, the Second
Draft indicated that the ULIB would apply to bills of exchange
which showed on their face a drawee situated in a country other
than the country of the payee or the place where payment was to be
made, and when a bill was drawn in favor of a payee in one state
and payable in another.37 Thus, under Second Draft ULIB article
1, the number of interacting elements in the case of a bill of exchange remained the same, but the expressed permutations increased from four to six.
Third Draft ULIB article 1 adopted the "signature/name-specific" alternative over the "general face" alternative for both bills
and notes. 3s Additionally, the working group decided, in the case of
34. The "signature/name-specific" alternative of article I states:
(3) An international promissory note is a written instrument which
(e)

shows (on its face) that at least two of the following places are (situated)
in different States
(i) the place indicated next to the signature of the drawer;
(ii) the place indicated next to the name of the drawee;
(iii) the place indicated next to the name of the payee;
(iv) the place of payment.
Second Draft ULIB, supra note 21.
The "general face provision" alternative of the Second Draft ULIB states:
(3) An international promissory note is a written instrument which
(e)

Shows (on its face) that it is either
(i) drawn in one State and payable in another, or
(ii) drawn in one State in favour of a payee in another; or
(iii) drawn in one State on a drawee in another; or
(iv) drawn on a drawee in one State and payable in another,
(v) drawn on a drawee in one State in favour of a payee in another; or
(vi) drawn in favour of a payee in one State and payable in another.
Second Draft ULIB, supra note 21.
The basic substantive difference between the two alternatives was the place emphasis of
the drawer in the "signature/name-specific" alternative, versus the state of drawing in the
"general face" provision alternative.
35. It should be noted that the working group was uncertain whether to include the "on
its face" language in the article, as evidenced by the parenthetical enclosure of the words in
the Second Draft ULIB.
36. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
37. Id This implicit policy shift whereby a greater assortment of multinational factors
could bring a negotiable instrument within the ambit of the ULIB was not discussed in the
working group reports.
38. See note 30 supra.
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bills, to expand the place factors by combining the place of the
drawer and the place of drawing which had been segregated in the
Second Draft's alternative provisions.3 9 Thus, the place factors applicable to bills of exchange increased to five interacting elements
with ten permutations.
The trend reflected in the various drafts of article I - increased interacting place factors and concomitant increased permutations raises the serious question of whether the
multinationality scope device contained in article 1 is wise. Assuming that the scheme proves to be mechanically workable, the great
variety of "multinational connectors" that could bring an instrument within the ambit of the Convention arguably impinges on
"inland payment transactions," where the key participants do not
have substantial multinational connections. 4°
c. Evolutionary Problems of the Multinationality Scope
Requirements. Five discernable evolutionary problems may be
gleaned from a study of the three drafts' multinationality scope
provisions and ULIB commentary: the "on the face" elimination;
the increased permutations of multinational place factors; the "signature/name-specific" requirement; the implicit detail in address
required to show multinationality; and, the deletion of an interpretive article on the effect of fabrication of multinationality on the
instrument.
Under GULB, a bill of exchange and a promissory note must
contain both written statements of the place where payment is to be
made and where the instrument is issued.4 Conversely, neither the
U.C.C. nor the BEA require "place designation" as formal requisites.4 2 The evolution of ULIB's substantive provisions dealing
with place designation illustrates how an attempted confluence of
these two types of municipal rules creates an undesirable result.
First Draft ULIB article 1 was ostensibly modelled after the GULB
rule which required express statement of places to be contained
within the instrument.4 3 This model was reinforced in the Second
Draft ULIB when the phrase "on the face" was added to the gen39. See id.
40. See Yntema's comment on the problem of defining "foreign bills" at text accompa-

nying note 32 supra.
41. GULB, supra note 2, arts. 1 & 75.
42. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1, § 3.
43. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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eral paragraph." However, the Third Draft ULIB eliminates the
"on the face" wording4 and clouds the use of the original GULB
model for place designation. The problem with using GULB as a
model, in this respect, is that the underlying policy rationale for
place designation as a formal requisite is quite different than
ULIB's underlying rationale. GULB stresses place designation of
payment and issuance because of the civil law emphasis on presentment for payment and the need to establish benchmarks for currency conversion. Express place designation of where payment is to
be made, and from where the instrument is issued, are absolutely
essential under GULB. ULIB, on the other hand, utilizes place
designation for the purpose of establishing "multinationality."
Under ULIB, express place designation on the face of the instrument is theoretically needed for only two factors out of many possible factors which might be indicated.
An additional problem with article 1 is that the underlying theory of the article is seemingly violated by Second Draft ULIB article 5346 where the place of payment, for purposes of presentment,
may be ascertained off the instrument. This poses the question
whether article 53 could be read together with article I whereby
only one on-face place designation other than place of payment
would be needed to establish multinationality. If this is the case,
such interpretation would violate the traditional notion of a negotiable instrument as a unitary and direct information source, since
the parties' obligation could be subject to an off-instrument
calculus that could not be clearly or simply ascertained, as local
rules of residence would be applicable.
A second evolutionary problem is the increased permutations
of place factors that may trigger multinationality under ULIB. It is
arguable that the increased permutations in the successive ULIB
44.
45.
46.
the
(g)

See note 34 supra.
See note 30 supra.
An article is duly presented for payment if it is presented in accordance with
following rules:
An instrument must be presented for payment

If no place of payment is specified and the address of the drawee or the
acceptor or the maker is not indicated, at the principal place of business
or residence of the drawee or the acceptor or the maker
(iv) In any other case, at the place where the drawee or the acceptor or the
maker can be found or at the last known principal place of business or
residence of the drawee or the acceptor or the maker.
Second Draft ULIB, supra note 21, art. 53.
(iii)
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drafts47 illustrate the process of unconscious substantive change
which arises in the legislative process when stylistic changes are really contemplated. In any case, the increased place permutations
not only increase the scope of the Treaty, but they potentially impinge on inland transactions where the vital parties do not have an
international connection. For example, under the Third Draft
ULIB provisions, if a drawer and a payee are located in the United
States and a drawee in another country - assuming all other form
requisites are complied with - ULIB would be applicable. Query:
do the parties' expectancy interests and the sovereign's governmental interests look toward the application of ULIB or the U.C.C.?
A third problem, ascertainable in reading the three drafts as a
conceptual whole, is the adoption in Third Draft ULIB article 1 of
the "signature/name-specific" requirement for the place factors of
drawer, maker, drawee, and payee. Thus, unless such place designations are contained next to the signature or name, the designation
will be invalid for multinationality purposes. No reference is made

in any of the drafting committee reports to the reason for such a
strict requirement. Presumably, it is an attempt to take the general
notion that multinationality should be readily ascertainable from

the face of the instrument one step farther by requiring that multinationality be ascertainable from certain areas on the face of the

instrument. Such a requirement, while tending to foster clarity and
ease of identification, will also tend to defeat the expressed judg-

ment of the working group that several formal requirements might
defeat application of ULIB.48 Further, the strictness of the rule ap-

pears to contradict the arguably liberal provision of article 53 for
looking outside the instrumerut with respect to place of payment for

multinationality purposes.49
A fourth evolutionary problem is confusion of the requisite detail in address necessary to establish multinationality under article

1. The First Draft ULIB commentary is confusing on this score,

and is not aided by the subsequent draft's commentary. For example, the commentary to First Draft ULIB article 1 states that the
multinationality requirement "does not require that detailed street
addresses or places in two different countries appear on the instru-

ment. For the purpose of internationality it suffices for the (instru47. See notes 33-40 supra, and accompanying text.
48. See text accompanying note 163 infra.
49. See note 46 supra, and accompanying text.
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ment) to mention two countries."5 However, the meaning of this
elaboration is clouded by the example within the commentary,
which states: "[t]hus, a bill drawn by J. Brown, New York, on F.
DuPont, France, or made payable to F. DuPont, France, would
meet the (multinationality) requirement ... .""' To state the obvious, New York is not a country. Indeed, it is not clear from the
example whether New York is a city, state, or province within a
country. While interpretational problems would probably not arise
if "New York" were used, what might happen if a lesser known city
such as Birmingham were designated? Would the reference be
sufficient to trigger multinationality under the Convention?
Finally, the Third Draft ULIB changes the prior two drafts by
eliminating article 2 52 _ a special article which would have served
to interpret the multinationality form requirement of article 1. The
prior drafts of article 2 provided a rule that statements made on the
face of an instrument were conclusively presumed to be true. That
provision would have served to forestall attacks on the form of an
instrument which might have alleged that multinationality was
willfully fabricated by a party to the instrument. The rationale of
the interpretive article 2 was that circulation of instruments under
the ULIB would be fostered by instilling confidence in potential
holders that their rights would remain inviolate, despite their
"knowledge" that the international entries were incorrect. 53 No explanation was given for the working group's deletion of article 2 in
the Third Draft ULIB. Admittedly, several drawbacks were present with the wording of the first two drafts.
First, in light of the Second Draft's deletion of article 6 which defined "knowledge" 5 4 - the First Draft ULIB commentary
to article 2, which specifically addressed a holder's "knowledge" of
50. First Draft ULIB, supra note 13, art. 1, commentary no. 10 (emphasis added).
51. Id (emphasis added).
52. First Draft article 2 states:
The incorrectness of statements made on an instrument for the purpose of paragraph (2)(e) or (3)(e) of this article I [multinationality form requirements] shall not
affect the application of this Law.
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22; see also id. commentary no. 2 and Second Draft ULIB,
supra note 21, art. 2 which, although stylistically different, is substantively identical.
53. See First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 2, commentary no. 2.
54. For the purpose of this Law, a person is considered to have "knowledge" of a
fact if he has actual knowledge thereof (or if the absence of knowledge thereof is
due to (gross) negligence on his part) (or if he has been informed thereof or if the

fact appears from the face of the instrument).
Id art. 6.
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a fact, was rendered confusing, if not ineffective.5 5 A second valid
criticism of the now defunct article 2 was the arguably inapposite
sanction mechanism contemplated by the article's commentary. It
is questionable why the working group in formulating the first two
drafts chose to adopt sanctions which would emanate from national
legislation,5 6 rather than providing for sanctions under the international agreement. It would have been more consonant with the
purpose of ULIB article 4,57 which acknowledges the international
character of the legislation and seeks to promote uniformity in the
interpretation and application of the law, to provide for international sanctions for false multinationality statements under the
ULIB.
Such drawbacks, however, do not seem to be cause for eliminating the entire article. To the extent that the article's deletion
worries potential holders that their rights will be compromised if
they know or suspect fabrication of multinationality on an instrument, it will inhibit the use of the proposed ULIB negotiable instruments.
2.

Locally Analagous Form Requirements

a. UnconditionalOrder or Promise. It was noted above that
when international sellers and their financial intermediaries use negotiable instruments they expect certainty and clarity in their fundamental right to be paid. Acknowledging this truth, the ULIB
working group adopted the traditional notion of existing local negotiable instrument laws that for an instrument to come within the
ambit of the Convention, it must contain language which amounts
to an order (in the case of a bill) or a promise (in the case of a
55. The commentary states:
[An incorrect statement as to the place of drawing or making.
so as to bring
the instrument under the uniform law, does not thereby make the instrument invalid. . . and cannot be a defence to be raised against a holder, even if such a holder
had knowledge of the fact that the statement is incorrect ....
Id art. 2, commentary no. 2 (emphasis added).
56. The commentary to First Draft ULIB article 2 provides:
This article does not preclude a party from bringing, outside the bill or note, an
action for damages against another party on the ground that he made frauduently
incorrect statements as to the place of drawing, payment, the address of the drawee
or that of the payee ....
Id commentary no. 3 (emphasis added).
57. Article 4 provides:
In the interpretation and application of this Law, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11.
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promissory note). 8 Given the interpretive problems which will
likely arise in the event that words other than "order" or "promise"
are used, it would have been advisable for the ULIB to set forth in
a specific definition similar to the U.C.C.,59 language which would
be deemed acceptable in meeting this requirement.60 Conceptually,
this would not seem to violate the "barebones" drafting approach
adopted by the working group.
Similarly, in conformity with the existing negotiable instrument codes, the Third Draft ULIB requires the order or promise to
pay to be "unconditional."' 6' Again, the ULIB engenders uncertainty by not defining the term "unconditional," apparently on the
belief that this word of art has a universal meaning. This, however,
is an erroneous assumption.6 2
58. Id arts. 1(2)(b) & (3)(b).
59. The U.C.C. provides:
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(b) An "order" is a direction to pay and must be more than an authorization or
request. It must identify the person to pay with reasonable certainty ....
(c) A "promise" is an undertaking to pay and must be more than an acknowledgment of an obligation.
U.C.C. § 3-102(l)(b) & (c) (1972 version).
60. But drafting efforts in this regard would have required a more thorough and prudent elaboration than that of the U.C.C. definition because of the possibility for a multiplicity of languages to appear on the ULIB instruments. The U.C.C. contemplates the vast bulk
of commercial paper to be written in English, flexible provision for judicial interpretation of
a specific and familiar language is thus appropriate. However, the ULIB expressly contemplates commercial paper to be written in a number of languages that are laden with enormous grammatical and syntactical variations. See Draft Uniform Law on International Bills
of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Draft Report of the Working Group
on the Work of Its Fourth Session (New York, 2-12 Feb. 1976), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.10/Add.I, art. 1, commentary no. 11 [hereinafter cited as Second
Draft ULIB Commentary]. Indeed, this commentary indicates that not only will several different languages be utilized in drawing and making different instruments subject to ULIB,
but also that several different languages might appear on the face of a single instrument
drawn on or made subject to the ULIB.
Hence, judicial interpretation under ULIB will frequently entail dealing with an unfamiliar language. Thus, it is questionable whether a broad provision for judicial review similar to that of the U.C.C. - is advisable under the ULIB. One feasible alternative approach would be the assemblage in the commentary to article I of a multilingual compendium of acceptable phrases having an equivalent to "order" or "promise." On the other
hand, it could be argued that a sketchy treatment in this area is justified, given the prospect
that preprinted forms will be utilized. A further reinforcement of the working group's approach is that neither the BEA nor the old Negotiable Instruments Law provided definitions
of "order" or "promise."
61. Third Draft ULIB, smpra note 11, arts. l(2)(b) & (3)(b).
62. J. Dohm, Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes 482 (1973) (unpublished thesis on file with Cornell Law School Library).
Indeed, references on an instrument which condition an order or promise and those
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b. Definite Sum of Money. Among the major legal systems,
definiteness of monetary obligation on the face of a commercial in63
strument has been a traditional requirement of negotiability.
Under the Anglo-American tradition, absolute sum certainty has

not been required because of the recognition of other competing
business needs.' For instance, since commercial paper is a form of
credit in addition to a mode of payment, common business practice

has indulged the inclusion of interest provisions and/or installment
agreements relating to the principal sum. 65 Further, to encourage
creditors to lend, the U.C.C. allows an instrument to provide for

payment with the cost of collection and/or attorney's fees upon default without destroying negotiability.6 6
The civil law experience, reflected in GULB, has been less accommodating to other business needs. This tradition reflects a
preference for structuring terms of credit by requiring the drawer or
maker to include interest in the principal sum. 67 The ULIB attempts a compromise between the Anglo-American and civil law

traditions68 by permitting a modest range of additions to a principal
sum denominated on an instrument, without destroying the certainty of the sum. Thus, Third Draft ULIB provides that a sum is
definite even if the paper requires it to be paid
(a) with interest; or (b) by installments; or (c) with an accelerawhich are deemed not to create a condition should be determined in accordance with wellconceived policy objectives reflected in law. It is spurious for the ULIB working group to
read into the proposed uniform law, policy objectives of a national legislature which may not
be appropriate in the international context. Thus, it would have been advisable for the working group to independently set forth in specific language those references which would and
would not render an order or promise conditional. Query: would such additions, however,
violate the barebones drafting approach adopted by the working group? See generally notes
160-63 Mfra, and accompanying text.
63. See U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1,§§ 3(1) & 83(1); GULB,
supra note 2, arts. 1(2) & 75(2). See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra for a discussion of
the values of clarity and conciseness of monetary undertaking.
64. See U.C.C. § 3-106 (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1, §§ 9(1) & 89(1).
65. U.C.C. § 3-106(l)(a) (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1,§§ 9(l)(a)-(b) & 89(1).
66. U.C.C. § 3-106(l)(e) (1972 version).
67. The GULB allows stipulation of interest only in the case of instruments payable at
sight or at a fixed period after sight. GULB, supra note 2, art. 5. Further, the GULB declares
null and void bills and notes payable by installments. Id art. 33(2).
68. It is interesting to compare the language used, albeit in the English translation, with
the major systems of municipal legislation regarding "sum certainty." This is helpful in
drawing out subtle differences between the systems. The U.C.C. and BEA employ the word
"definite" - a word that means "having distinct or certain limits;" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 592 (unabridged ed. 1971).
GULB uses the word "determinate," which means "having defined limits." Id. at 616.
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tion provision upon non-payment of an installment; or (d) according to a rate of exchange; or (e) in a currency other than the
currency in which the amount of the instrument is expressed; or
(f) under a particular contract number, letter of credit number,
debit account number, and other equivalent clauses.6 9
Following the law under the BEA and GULB7 ° and rejecting
the U.C.C. approach, the working group chose not to provide that a
monetary sum is definite even though the sum might make provision for payment "with costs of collection or an attorney fee or both
upon default."'" Such'an omission is wise. While one commentator has argued in favor of including such an exception in the ULIB
by noting that such collection clauses are valuable in countries like
the United States,7 2 this approach ignores the enormous uncertainty that would come about in the international milieu as a result
of such clauses. Attorneys' fees for comparable legal services vary
considerably from one country to the next. 73 Thus, to allow provision for attorneys' fees in collecting the principal sum would tend to
inhibit the use of international instruments out of fear that unknown and possibly onerous foreign rate schedules would apply.
In addition, such provisions would raise difficult conflict of law issues focusing on which jurisdiction's fee rate should apply. Moreover, such an exception to sum certainty would frustrate the
desirability of affording ready calculation of the total amount due
from the face of the instrument. Finally, since the ULIB is an optional legal regime, creditors with sufficient bargaining power are
69. Third Draft ULIB, .supranote 11, art. 7. The Third Draft added the "contract, letter
of credit" paragraph. The revision commentary noted:
The appearance in the instrument of clauses: 'issued under the Contract
No. . . .', 'issued under Letter of Credit No. . . .', 'in debit of account No. .. ',
and other equivalent clauses, not included in the body of the instruments and
merely referring either to the transaction which gave rise to the instrument, or to
the source out of which payment is to be made, does not make the order or the
promise to pay conditional, if it is unconditional in all other respects.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 7, commentary no. 12.
It is questionable from a craftsmanship perspective whether the new paragraph inserted
by the working group in the Third Draft ULIB was appropriately placed in article 7. Subparagraphs (a)-(e) all deal with issues pertaining to monetary amount: installments overtime,
interest, rate of exchange, and currency. On the other hand, the new subparagraph (f) goes
to the principle of conditionality of the obligation, a matter which would have been more
appropriately dealt with in article 1.
70. No references are found to "costs of collection" within these codes.
71. U.C.C. § 3-106(l)(e) (1972 version).
72. Dohm, supra note 62, at 484. Dohm argues that collection clauses are valuable in
the United States in order to add creditor attraction to paper and to counteract the rule that a
party losing a law suit is not bound to reimburse the expenses of the prevailing party.
73. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 275 nn.25-27, 489-90 (3d ed. 1971).
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free to choose legislation similar to the U.C.C. if inclusion of collection clauses is subjectively important.
Uncertainty of sum may result from ambiguities in the instrument, as distinguished from non-exempted special payment provisions discussed above. Where it is unclear from the face of a ULIB
instrument how much is to be paid, the instrument fails to meet the
formality requirements of articles l(2)(b) and (3)(b). The Third
Draft ULIB provides rules of construction - similar to the U.C.C.,
the BEA, and GULB74 - where the instrument is ambiguous or
where there are omissions therein.
The initial rule of construction provides that where a discrepancy exists in the amount payable between words and a numerical
sum, the instrument is to be construed in accordance with the written figure.7" While this rule is useful where figures are ambiguous
and the words are not, it fails to make provision for the possibility
that words may be ambiguous. A more flexible tool of construction
would provide that words control figures except that if words are
ambiguous, figures control.7 6
A second rule of construction under the Third Draft ULIB envisages the case where an instrument is drawn payable in a currency having the same general denomination in one or more
states.77 Under such circumstances, "the currency is to be considered as the currency of the State where payment is to be made.""8
There is an obvious theoretical problem with this rule: it assumes
that the state where payment is to be made will always be indicated
on the instrument. Consequently, no allowance is made for the
case where currency denomination is ambiguous, but the state
74. See U.C.C. § 3-118 (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1,§§ 9 & 72(4); GULB, supra
note 2, art. 6.
75. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 8(1).
76. This is the formulation under the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 3-118(c) (1972 version).
However, it is arguable that the ULIB rule of construction is justified under a barebones
approach where written words will rarely be ambiguous.
77. For example, the "dollar" is the official currency of both Canada and the United
States.
78. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 8(2). Minor modifications of article 8(2) occurred in the Third Draft ULIB. As it stood before the revisions, the rule of construction
read:
If the sum payable by an instrument is specified in a currency having the same
denomination in at least one other State than the State where payment is to be
made as indicated on the instrument and the specified currency is not identified as
the currency of any State, the denomination is to be considered as that of the currency of the State where payment is to be made.
Second Draft ULIB, upra note 21, art. 8(2).
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where payment is to be made is not apparent from the face of the
paper. It seems anamolous that the ULIB clearly permits multinationality in cases where the place of payment is not stipulated,7 9 but
other international requisites appear, while article 8 provides a rule
of construction of monetary certainty only where the state where
payment is to be made is indicated on the instrument.8" Another
criticism is the lack of provision for "the case of a bill drawn in
Paris, payable in Rome, but calling for dollars of some unspecified
country. Such a sum would indeed be uncertain. 8 1 Given the
great importance which the Eurodollar market plays in international finance, lack of a provision solving this form of uncertainty is
quite undesirable.8 2
A possible solution that would clear up the above criticisms
and give important flexibility to an area where problems with great
repercussions could occur, would be to provide for a "reasonable
reference" rule in cases where the state of payment was not indicated but the multinationality requirement was met. Such a rule
would allow the holder to look to the currency of his choosing, if
reasonable under the above circumstances.8 3 The concept for this
approach would not be unprecedented. For example, the U.C.C.
permits a holder of an instrument ambiguous as to whether it is a
bill or note, to treat it as either.8 4 A reasonable reference policy
79. See notes 34 and 46 supra, and accompanying text.
80. However, since it will be rare that the place for payment is not specified on an
international bill, there is some justification in the approach taken by the working group.
81. Report by Professor Norman Penney to the United States Department of State
(Sept. 1977), at 17 (copy on file with California Western InternationalLaw Journal).
82. See generallyCalhoun, Eurodollar Loan Agreements. An Introductionand Discussion
of Some Special Problems, 32 Bus. LAW. 1785 (1977). To the question, "What are Eurodollars?", Calhoun responds:
Eurodollars are generally defined as United States Dollars ("Dollars") held by a
bank (including a branch of an American bank) or other persons located outside of
the United States. There are other Eurocurrencies as well, but in much smaller
amounts. A Eurocurrency similarly is defined as the currency of a sovereign nation
which is owned by a bank or other person located outside of such nation and which
is freely available for transfer to and from such nation. The principal other
Eurocurrencies are the Euro Deutschemark and the Euro Swissfranc. There are
also lesser quantities of Eurosterling, Euroguilders, and other Eurocurrencies. By
1976 it was estimated that the total market for Eurocurrencies substantially exceeded $200 billion. It is estimated that Eurodollars account for more than 70% of
total Eurocurrencies.
Id
83. "Reasonable" would be determined by a multi-factor analysis, including: (1)
whether the "chosen" currency was a prevalent Eurocurrency in the country where the instrument was drawn; and (2) the knowledge and sophistication of the payee, that is, whether
it was a relatively small international sales business or a huge multinational bank.
84. U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (1972 version).
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would provide needed flexibility and fairness, while proving administratively workable in the long run.
The final construction provisions in the ULIB for interpreting
ambiguous monetary sums are directed at those instruments which
aver to interest. Third Draft ULIB article 8 makes provision for the
date from which interest is to run if the instrument contains no
specifications. Specifically, if an instrument states that it is to be
paid with interest, without mentioning the date from which interest
is to run, interest is considered to run from the date of the instrument.8 5 While this rule comports with the requirement that an instrument must be dated to fall within the ULIB,86 it leaves open the
possibility that the possessor of an undated instrument may reap a
profit by erroneously completing the instrument at a date prior to
its actual issuance, pursuant to the liberal rule of ULIB article 11,87
and negotiating it. Indeed, under the ULIB rule which requires an
instrument to be dated, possessors of undated instruments are encouraged to provide a date,8 8 thus creating an arguable incentive
for unauthorized completion. Unfortunately, other local systems of
law do not offer alternative solutions that abide by the particular
provision of the ULIB which requires an instrument to be dated.
Under the U.C.C., for example, the problem of determining the period of time in which interest is payable if no time is stated is approached by looking to the date of the instrument, or if undated,
from the date of issue.8 9 This would be untenable under the ULIB.
Thus, it seems that the ULIB provides the only feasible rule of construction, given the adoption of a policy requiring an instrument to
be dated in order to come within the ambit of the Convention.
Third Draft ULIB, rejecting the reading-in of any interest if no
specific figure is cited, is a major change from the rule of the First
Draft ULIB which made provision for a 5.0% simple rate of annual
interest if the instrument contained no specific rate.9 0 It is questionable whether the working group made a wise decision in determin85. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 8(3).
86. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, arts. l(2)(d) & (3)(d) & commentary no. 23.
87. Article 11 provides:
An incomplete instrument... which is signed by the drawer or the maker but
which lacks elements pertaining to one or more of the requirements set out in
paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 1 may be completed and the instrument so completed is
effective as a bill or a note.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 11(1).
88. Id
89. U.C.C. § 3-118(d) (1972 version).
90. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 8(4). The revised draft provides:
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ing that the First Draft should be aligned with the GULB interest
provision.9 First, the vast majority of respondents to the question-

naire favored interest clauses in such contingencies. 92 Second, it
will defeat parties' expectations and run counter to bargained-for
terms of trade to construe an instrument directing payment "with
interest" to have contemplated principal alone. These important
considerations should have outweighed any administrative incon-

venience and national or regional money market differential concerns which might be directed toward the application of a
standardized interest rate. Indeed, the First Draft ULIB interest

provision would have minimized administrative calculations and
struck a reasonable compromise between regional money market
interest rates.

In closing discussion of Third Draft ULIB articles 7 and 8, it is
useful to examine rules of construction which the working group
failed to include. At least three such rules - all contained in the
U.C.C. - would have been rational to have included in the international legislative scheme. First is the provision that where there

is doubt stemming from the form of an instrument, whether it is a
draft or a note, the holder may treat it as either. 93 Second is the rule
that handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms, and
typewritten terms control printed ones.94 Third is the stipulation
A stipulation on an instrument stating that it is to be paid with interest is to be
disregarded unless it indicates the rate at which interest is to be paid.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 8(4).
91. GULB provides:
When a bill of exchange is payable at sight, or at a fixed period after sight, the
drawer may stipulate that the sum payable shall bear interest. In the case of any
other bill of exchange, this stipulation is deemed not to be written (non icrite). The
rate of interest must be specified in the bill; in default of such specification, the
stipulation shall be deemed not to be written (non icrite).
GULB, supra note 2, art. 5.
92. Curiously, First Draft ULIB article 8(4) was realigned, in the subsequent drafts, to
the restrictive view of interest set forth in article 5 GULB. In light of the vast majority of
trading and banking respondents to the Secretary-General's questionnaire favoring interest
clauses, see 1 UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at 250, para. 44(f) & n.71, query whether the overt
reason given by the working group that allowing such interest clauses would be too complicated, arbitrary, and rigid was merely a smokescreen for the true reason of rejection: the
working group did not want to overly "Americanize" the Convention. If this supposition is
correct, it is indeed unfortunate that political reasons interfere with legitimate trading preferences. However, perhaps the political compromise of the GULB nations in acquiescing to
the informal provisions of Third Draft ULIB articles 7(a) and (b), see note 69 supra, and
accompanying text, had to be counter-balanced with the deletion of the United States rule of
construction regarding unstated interest.
93. See U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (1972 version).
94. See U.C.C. § 3-118(b) (1972 version).
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that certain additional promises - going beyond a payment undertaking - which pertain to the security or enforcement of an obligation should be expressly authorized and should not jeopardize an
instrument's status under the law. 95 The effect of such additional
provisions would be to make the instrument stronger and more effective, and to prevent the maker from impairing the value of the
security. The only justification for keeping these useful provisions
out of the ULIB is the "barebones" approach which has been
adopted as an underlying premise of the entire ULIB drafting ef96
fort.
c. To a Specqied Person or His Order.97 Under Third Draft
ULIB article 1 it is stated that an international bill of exchange and
promissory note is one "whereby the drawer directs the drawee to
95. See U.C.C. § 3-119(1) & (2) (1972 version).
96. For a criticism of the barebones approach, see section II(A) of this article infra, at
pp. 68-72.
Another less obvious omission from articles 7 and 8 is the lack of a definition for the
term "money," despite the First Draft's commentary which refers the reader to article 7 for a
definition. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 1, commentary no. 7. One commentator has
argued that such a definitional omission is likely to create confusion and uncertainty especially with respect to instruments in a particular kind of "current money" not recognized as
legal tender. Dohm, supra note 62, at 482-84. This argument may be a bit overstated. The
NIL, see note 116 infra, contains no definition of money; neither does the BEA. Such a
definition was new with the U.C.C. Dohm's argument seems to be unduly tainted with an
American perception of negotiable instruments law. For details on "current money" usage
in some legal systems, see W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDER THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE 5-6 (1959).
97. The ULIB does make provision, through article 10, for payment to more than one
payee in addition to allowing two or more drawers, makers, or payees. Article 10 is a refinement of article I ULIB. Article I sets forth provisions for the "normal" case where one
drawer/maker, and one payee will be indicated on the face of an instrument. Third Draft
ULIB article 10 provides for the "unusual" by stating:
(1) A bill may
(a) Be drawn upon two or more drawees
(b) Be drawn by two or more drawers
(c) Be payable to two or more payees
(2) A note may
(a) Be made by two or more makers
(b) Be payable to two or more payees
(3) If an instrument is payable to two or more payees in the alternative, it is payable to any one of them and any one of them in possession of the instrument may
exercise the rights of the holder. In any other case the instrument is payable to all
of them and the rights of a holder can only be exercised by all of them.
(4) A bill may be drawn by the drawer on himself or be drawn payable to his
order.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 10 & commentary no. 30.
As the majority of respondents to the Secretary-General's questionnaire favored an express ULIB multi-party provision, and the principal existing codes have similar multi-party
provisions, the article is justified. See BEA, supra note 1, §§ 6(2), 7 & 37(3); U.C.C. §§ 3110(l)(d) & 3-116 (1972 version).
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pay . . . the payee or to his order." 98 Thus, commentary to the
First Draft ULIB points out, a bill or note under the ULIB may be
denoted either "pay to X," "pay to the order of X," or "pay to X or
to his order."9 9
Two important norms follow from the language of article 1.
First, specific words of negotiability are not required for commercial paper to attain the status of a negotiable instrument. Second,
an international instrument under the ULIB cannot be made payable to bearer.
Confficting arguments can be put forth regarding the ULIB's
lack of a requirement of specific words of negotiability. On the one
hand, since an instrument must be expressly designated as an "International Bill of Exchange," or as an "International Promissory
Note" to be subject to the ULIB, it has been suggested that additional words of negotiability would be mere "surplusage."'" Such
an argument is based on the assumption that the terms "bill" and
"note" universally connote negotiability. Bolstering the nonnegotiable words policy is the conclusion of the working group that adding formal requirements under the ULIB might give rise to cases
where, due to the lack of a requirement on an instrument, the instrument would not be negotiable under the Convention.' 0 '
On the other hand, the argument exists that, at least with respect to the United States tradition, "more than any other symbols,
the words 'order' and 'bearer' are supposed to put a party on notice
that he is dealing with a negotiable instrument."'' 0 2 The argument

would continue that, given the predominant position that the
United States presently holds in international trade, such a cherished tradition should be respected.' 0 3
An approach which could have satisfied both sides would have
been to change the required designation under article 1, so that a
ULIB instrument would bear on its face the words "negotiable in98. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 1(2)(b) & (3)(b).
99. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 1, commentary no. 8.
100. See Dohm, supra note 62, at 484.
101. Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Draft
Report of the Working Group on the Work of its Fourth Session (New York, 2-12 Feb.
1976), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.10/Add. 3, art. 1, commentary no. 14.
102. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 464 (1972).
103. Note the prevailing tension; the United States is the major force in international
trade and its customs and trading practices should be respected; versus, a multinational
treaty should represent a global solution to negotiable instrument problems and should not
be an overly-Americanized set of laws.
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ternational bill of exchange" along with a reference to "the Convention of." This amendment would have constituted a de minimis
increment in formal requirements, while serving explicit notice to
United States parties that negotiability was contemplated.
The result that a ULIB instrument cannot be made payable "to
bearer" is somewhat questionable. The rationale for this legal proscription was strong pressure from certain European central banks
to bar instruments made payable "to bearer," in order to protect
against the use of such instruments as a currency substitute or as a
Such central bank objecdevice to avoid exchange control laws.'
tions, not being based on empirical evidence and emanating from
unidentified sources, should have been subject to more penetrating
analysis by the working group. Moreover, plausible arguments exist
for allowing an international instrument to be payable to bearer.
First, the ULIB allows bills to be drawn to a drawer's order; ULIB
also permits an order instrument to become a bearer instrument by
0 5 Thus, endorsement in blank, espean endorsement in blank."
cially in the instance of a bill drawn payable to a drawer's order, is
legally equivalent to the initial issuance "to bearer."" Second,
under Anglo-American law, bearer paper has proven operationally
successful for 150 years.'
d Payable on Demand or at a Defnite Time. Third Draft
ULIB article 1 requires that an international bill or note be payable
either on demand or at a definite time. 0 8 The commentary' °9 to
the First Draft ULIB article 1 specifically refers to article 9 for a
definition of the terms "on demand" and "at a definite time." Accordingly, the following discussion addresses the content of article
9.
Third Draft ULIB article 9 provides that an instrument is payable on demand if it states the same, or if it is payable at sight or on
104. Draft Report of Professor Norman Penney to the United States Department of State
(1977), at 6 (unpublished report on file with Calfornia Western International Law Journal).
105. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 1, commentary no. 8 & art. 5(5)(b).
106. This argument is somewhat diluted by the realities of international commerce
whereby the vast majority of instruments are not endorsed, but merely pass from one inter-

national bank to another.
107. Dohm, supra note 62, at 485.
108. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 1(2)(c) & 3(c).
109. To come within this Law, a bill must be an "unconditional order" ... to pay
"a definite sum of money".. . "on demand" or "at a definite time" (as defined in
article 9) ....
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. I, commentary no. 7.
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presentment, or if no time for payment is expressed."10 A flexible
rule of construction is incorporated in the article, allowing an instrument to fulfill the requirement of "payment on demand" if it
contains words similar in import to "on demand," "at sight," or "on
presentment.""' A cause for criticism derives from this construction provision, as amplified by the commentary to First Draft ULIB
article 9 which allows a court interpreting demand instrument
phraseology virtually unbridled discretion in finding "words of
similar import.""' While it is, no doubt, sound policy to make provision for accepting varying and well established expressions, it
seems nevertheless desirable to provide greater canalization for judicial decision.
In accordance with BEA," 3 Third Draft ULIB article 9 provides that "an instrument which is accepted or endorsed or guaranteed after maturity is an instrument payable on demand as regards
the acceptor, the endorser, or the guarantor."'"' This provision is
subject to attack along lines set forth in the commentary to U.C.C.
section 3-108" l5 criticizing an identical "after-maturity" rule of the
old Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law" 16 which was rejected by
the U.C.C. draftsmen. One recent commentator has parroted this
criticism vis-4-vis the ULIB, quoting the applicable U.C.C. commentary as follows:
[The after maturity rule] is obvious but its wording is misleading.
The language implies "that the ordinary rules relating to demand instruments as to due course, holding, presentment, notice
of dishonor and such were applicable." Article 57 entitles the
indorser after maturity to presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor. However, article 5(9) (now article 5(7)) [stipulates that] a
person taking a time paper after maturity cannot become a protected holder. Thus article 9(2) serves "no special purpose except
to trap the unwary." Since an instrument after maturity must be
110. Third Draft ULIB, smpra note 11, art. 9(l)(a) & (b).
111. Id art. 9(l)(a).
112. The commentary to the First Draft ULIB provides:
Paragraph (l)(a) permits a wide latitude in the use of expressions which make an

instrumenipayable on demand. The requirement of one standard expression would
not appear to be justifiable in view of well-established practices in different parts of
the world.
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 9, commentary no. I (emphasis added).
113. BEA, supra note 1,§ 10(2).
114. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 9(2).
115. U.C.C. § 3-108, official comment (1972 version).
116. Negotiable Instruments Law § 7 (Brannan's 7th ed. 1948) [hereinafter referred to as
NIL]. U.C.C. article 3 superseded the old Negotiable Instruments Law.
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regarded as a demand paper, this rule should be deleted.' 1 7
Superficially, this criticism would appear to be warranted.

Upon closer examination, however, a rationale - clothed with the
fabric of reasonableness - can be discerned with respect to the
working group's approval of Third Draft ULIB article 9.
The reason for requiring time certainty in the promise or order
to pay relates to stability and predictability in business transactions.
The time for payment of a commercial instrument is vital to all
parties concerned, and uncertainty in this regard is commercially
objectionable."' Without time certainty, the value of commercial
paper is so speculative that it cannot be accorded the protection of a
negotiable instrument. Thus, Third Draft ULIB article 9 serves the
important purpose of expressly declaring a time instrument, negotiated after maturity, to be a demand instrument. Without this express provision, business uncertainty would prevail as to whether
the instrument was valid under the Convention.
Second, the assertion that article 9 acts as "a trap for the unwary" is of limited truth. The ULIB should be read as an integrated whole. Third Draft ULIB article 5 is obviously the
dispositive provision which deals with the status of a protected
holder.I' Any deception that results from Third Draft ULIB article 9 is not linked to wariness, but to basic statutory construction.
If any criticism is called for with respect to this article, it is that
there are insufficient cross references to other articles of the Convention.
Third Draft ULIB article 9 provides further that an international instrument is payable at a definite time if it states that it is
payable:
(a) On a stated date or at a fixed period after a stated date or at
a fixed period after the date of the instrument; or
(b) At a fixed period after sight; or
(c) By installments at successive dates; or
(d) By installments at successive dates with the stipulation on
the instrument that upon default in payment of any install117. Dohm, supra note 62, at 485.
118. C. WEBER, COMMERCIAL PAPER 58 (1975).
119. Article 5 states:
'Protected holder' means a holder of an instrument which, when it came into his
possession, was complete and regular on its face and not overdue, provided that, at

that time, he was without actual knowledge of any claim to or defence upon the
instrument or of the fact that it was dishonoured for non-acceptance or non-payment.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 5(7).
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ment the unpaid balance becomes due.' 2 0
Sections (a) and (b) are unobjectionable. Fixed-period-afterdate instruments and fixed-period-after-sight instruments are in
common usage in intranational and international trade, and well
established municipal laws have been adopted to handle their legal
repercussions.' 2' Sections (c) and (d), however, are subject to some
criticism. The First Draft ULIB commentary notes that the
sections provide a rule of definiteness parallel to article 7(b)'s
"definiteness of sum" provision. 22 Such provision is wise, notwithstanding the existence of similar rules in the Anglo-American local
codes. 23 Since the ULIB is a piece of international legislation
which draws upon diverse traditions of negotiable instruments law,
any matter of doubt should be eliminated. What might seem selfevident to Anglo-Americans may be foreign to European and
Asian legal counsel and businesspersons who are familiar with
GULB. However, the language "at successive dates" in both sections (c) and (d) is misleading. Since the phrase is not expressly
defined, it is proper to interpret the words by their clear meaning.
An undesirable plain meaning interpretation would be that later
installment due dates need not be stated but can be left indefinite.
A clearer provision would have utilized the following language: by
installments at successive stated dates.
Third Draft ULIB article 9, while not in express terms, impliedly admits acceleration clauses into the terms of the Convention."2 Extension clauses, however, are not addressed, expressly or
by implication. Such cursory treatment of important and commonly used devices under local negotiable instruments laws is disturbing. Further, it is puzzling why the Second Draft ULIB did not
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
(3)

Id art. 9(3).
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-109 (1972 version).
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 9, commentary no. 6.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-109 (1972 version); BEA, supra note 1, § 11.
Article 9 provides:
A bill is payable at a definite time if it states that it is payable
By installments at successive dates, even when it is stipulated in the bill
that upon default in payment of any installment the unpaid balance shall
become due immediately.]
A note is payable at a definite time if it states that it is payable
[(c)

(4)

By installments at successive dates, even when it is stipulated in the note
that upon default in payment of any installment the unpaid balance
shall become due immediately.]
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11.
[(b)
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respond to the policy query of First Draft ULIB's commentary, 25
or the directive by the working group for supplementary rules in
this area. 2 6 Admittedly, the normative question of whether acceleration and extension clauses should come within the ULIB is not
capable of easy resolution. Nevertheless, the working group failed
to even consider the most rudimentary aspects of the problem. In
this regard, it would have been appropriate to have considered the
following five issues.
An initial inquiry is whether acceleration clauses should
justifiably be excluded from the ULIB on the ground that situations
may occur in which the holder does not, and cannot, know from the
face of the instrument that a default has occurred, and that, consequently, the unpaid balance is due. A superficially easy solution to
such a problem would be to eliminate a holder's attendant hardship
by a provision similar to the U.C.C. according to which "delay in
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is excused when the
party is without notice that it is due. . . and he exercises reason' 27
able diligence after the cause of the delay ceases to operate."'
However, this approach is pregnant with difficulties of definition.
The various legal systems differ considerably in their conception of
such terms as "notice" and "diligence." Before a U.C.C. type provision could be inserted, concensus of definition would be required.
Second, a related problem is making provision under the Convention for the possibility of abuse by a holder who could accelerate
without justifiable cause by merely declaring that he feels insecure.
Definitional roadblocks again appear in attempting to skirt the
problem with a provision similar to the U.C.C. which provides that
the holder may accelerate only "if he in good faith believes the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the
power has been exercised."' 28 Common law conceptions and traditions of "good faith" and "burden of proof" are quite different
from civil law notions of these concepts. A third problem is that
125. [Article 9(3)(c) and 9(4)(b) are] put between brackets to indicate doubt as to
whether such [an acceleration] rule is advisable.
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, commentary no. 6.
126. See Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Work of Its Fourth Session (New
York, 2-12 Feb. 1976), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.10/Add. 5, art. 9, commentary no.
10(b) [hereinafter cited as Second Draft ULIB commentary, Add. 5].
127. U.C.C. § 3-511(l) (1972 version).
128. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972 version).
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some protection for a holder is required where the maker, drawer,
drawee, or acceptor becomes bankrupt; likewise, where the maker,
drawer, drawee, or acceptor stops payment on the instrument.
Fourth, if an extension clause is exercised, it is necessary to provide
the number of extensions allowed and how long they may run. Finally, difficulties will arise if a holder is able to exercise his option
to extend the time of payment over the objection of the maker or
acceptor or other party who duly tenders full payment when the
instrument is due. It would probably be advisable to prohibit such
conduct in order to prevent a holder from refusing payment or
keeping interest running against the wishes of the maker or acceptor or another party. An alternative solution would be to release
the obligor under the instrument if payment is tendered, or to provide that interest would not run under such circumstances.
Third Draft ULIB article 9 also provides that "[t]he time of
payment for an instrument payable at a fixed period after date is to
be determined by the date of the instrument. The maturity of a bill
payable at a fixed period after sight is determined by the date of the
acceptance."' 2 9 It is arguable that, in deliberating on this section,
the working group distorted the meaning of the First Draft ULIB
commentary 30 to Article 9 which called for insertion of a date on
an incomplete instrument in accordance with "presumed authority"
provisions of Article 11.131 Specifically, the working group in their
report on First Draft ULIB article 9 interpreted this section to "provide that the expression 'date on the instrument' means the date
stated on the instrument regardlessof the true date."'32 The working group's interpretation suggests that a holder can complete an
undated instrument without the authorization - presumed or
otherwise - of the maker or drawer. This would directly contradict the actual provisions of article 11.'33 For purposes of clarity, it
129. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 9(4).
130. This commentary provides:
If the instrument states that it is payable at a fixed period after date, and no
such date is indicated, the instrument is incomplete. The possessor of the instrument has the right to insert the date in accordance with the provisions of article 11.
First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 9(4), commentary no. 8.
131. See note 87 supra.
132. Second Draft ULIB Commentary, Add. 5, supra note 126, commentary no. 12 (emphasis added).
133. Article I I provides:
When such an instrument is completed otherwise than in accordance with the
agreements entered into
(a) A party who signed the instrument before the completion may invoke the
non-observance of the agreement as a defence against a holder or against any other
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would have been helpful for the working group to have elaborated
their comments to article 9(4).
e. Signed by the Drawer or Maker. Under the Third Draft

ULIB, an international bill or note must be signed by the drawer or
maker. 3 4 Without explicitly defining the expressions "signed" or
"signature," the ULIB richly avers to their significance. Third
Draft ULIB, for instance, states that "'forged signature' includes a
signature which is forged by the wrongful or unauthorized use of a
stamp, symbol, facsimile, perforation or other means by which a
signature may be made in accordance with article 27."'1

The Sec-

ond Draft ULIB, in turn, provides that "a signature may be in
handwriting or by facsimile, perforations, symbols, or any other
mechanical means."' 36 Further, the latter draft makes it clear that
the signature of either or both a "private" or a "trade" name is
sufficient to establish the signer's liability on the instrument. 137 It is
the fact of signing, not the name which is signed, that is the decisive
factor.
While the meaning of "signature" is abundantly referred to in
the various ULIB drafts, it would nevertheless have been desirable
to expressly include such a definition in the general definition article 5. Such a definition would state not merely what may comprise
a signature -

as well as a forged signature -

and what the legal

significance of a signature is, but also cross reference the reader to
all sections in the Treaty which deal with the concept of "signature."
f. Date of the Instrument. Third Draft ULIB requires the inperson who exercises a right of recourse in accordance with article 68, provided
such a person or holder has knowledge of the non-observance of the agreement.
(b) A party who signed the instrument after the completion is liable according to the terms of the instrument so completed.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 11(2)(a) & commentary no. 33 & 1l(2)(b) & commentary no. 35.

An alternative interpretation of the interaction between the working group's commentary to article 9(4), see note 130 supra, and the provisions of article 11 is that the asserted
date as completed should be presumed to be conclusive and that it would not be impossible
to show the "true date" in appropriate circumstances, as deliniated by article II. This interpretation, however, ignored the strong language "regardless of the true date" of the working
group deliberations. Query, however, what the authority of the working group deliberations
would be on the interpretation of the ULIB.
134. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 1(2)() & commentary no. 23 & 1(3)(f) &
commentary no. 27.
135. Id art. 5(10).
136. Second Draft ULIB, supra note 21, art. 27(3).
137. Id art. 27(2).
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strument to be dated;' 38 this requirement reflects a shift in policy
from the First Draft ULIB which did not have such a requirement.
The change represents an exception to the general ULIB policy of
limiting formal requirements of the international instrument. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the date of the instrument is relevant to other provisions of the Convention,' 3 9 the change would
appear to be sound.
B.

Choice of Law

The Third Draft ULIB represents a functionally restrictive
substantive conflicts of law rule that will govern a contracting
state's choice of negotiable instruments law, and provide non-binding authority for a non-contracting state."4 The trip-switch for setting off the ULIB is a state court's finding an instrument to comply
with the formal requirements of article 1 (2) and (3).141 Thus, once
an instrument is found to be an international bill of exchange or an
international promissory note, the forum of a contracting state will
apply the ULIB rather than its own domestic negotiable instruments law, or the negotiable instruments law of another jurisdiction
which, under court-fashioned conflicts policy, might otherwise be
applicable. A court need not look beyond the face of the instrument; in other words, the fact that one or more of the countries
indicated on the bill or note are not contracting states is immaterial
to the issue of choice of law. This rule is both well conceived and
effective; it serves to maximize the applicability of the Convention
and to foster an international modus operandito negotiable instrument problems, while upholding parties' expectations in the process.
The applicability of the Convention faces uncertainty only if
theforum is a non-contracting state. In such a situation, assuming
the instrument meets all of the form requirements of article 1, the
non-contracting state'sforum could choose (1) to reject the parties'
intentions and apply the law called for by its internal conflicts rule;
(2) to give effect to the parties' intentions of having the ULIB gov138. Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. l(2)(d) & (3)(d).
139. See, e.g., text accompanying note 120 supra.
140. This law applies without regard to whether the places indicated on an international bill of exchange or on an international promissory note pursuant to paragraph 2(f) or 3(f) of article I are situated in contracting States.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art. 3.
141. See notes 33 and 34 supra; see also First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 3, commentary nos. 1-7.
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ern matters of validity and construction; or (3) to engage in
de&pecage - mixing provisions with another negotiable instruments
law.
The likelihood is that the non-contracting state's forum would
give effect to the parties' intentions reflected in the ULIB designation clause on the instrument. This result would stem from the fact
that the majority of legal systems adhere to the principle of party
autonomy with respect to issues of contract law." a2 This principle
directs that the express choice of law in a contract is valid, subject
to three alternative exceptions:
(1) the application of the law of the chosen jurisdiction would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a jurisdiction possessing a
materially greater interest than the chosen state with respect to
the issue of validity; (2) there is no reasonable basis for the parties' choice of the chosen jurisdiction, since it bears no substantial relationship to the parties to
the transaction, or; (3) there was
143
no true consent to the choice.
Since ULIB is a neutral law, combining the most reasonable
precepts of the major local laws on commercial paper, 144 application of the ULIB can not reasonably be found to be against the
fundamental policy of a non-contracting state or the law of a noncontracting state to which it is directed under its internal choice of
law rule. Similarly, because the ULIB has been "especially adopted
to the specific needs of international instruments and thoroughly
worked out by an international organization with the collaboration
of all interested groups,"145 there will always be a substantial relationship between an international payments transaction and the
ULIB and, thus, a reasonable basis for the parties' choice of the
same.
The only troublesome exception that the forum of a non-contracting state might reasonably find would relate to a lack of true
consent to the choice of ULIB as the governing law. The reasoning
might progress as follows: the choice of the ULIB is always made
by a drawer or a maker, and only a drawer or maker. Subsequent
parties to an instrument with a ULIB designation - including the
payee - are confronted with a "take it or leave it" proposition. In
effect, according to this reasoning, the instrument is an unbar142. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 270 & n.23 (1971).

143. Id
144. Dohm, mpra note 62, at 479.
145. Id
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gained-for adhesion contract. However, this line of reasoning
would ignore the recurring informal payment arrangements that
parties in international trade tend to make before a bill is drawn or
a note is made, and the fact that international banks with competent legal counsel would be the major users of ULIB instruments.
Beyond the jurisprudence of the principle of party autonomy
which would arise from the internal law of non-contracting states
lies the knotty interpretational problem that will attend signatories
of the Geneva Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts
of Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes (GCC). 14 6 Some foreign commentators have construed this
Convention to preclude its members from applying the principle of
party autonomy in choice of law with respect to international instruments. 147 Under this view, a state not contracting to ULIB but
contracting to the GCC would be compelled to apply the conflicts
rules of the latter. However, the prospect for this result will diminish as more nations become ULIB signatories. Moreover, the
aforementioned interpretational view is subject to opposite interpretation. 48 Indeed, the existence of uniform international legislation such as the ULIB represents modernization and a step up from
agreement to conflict of law rules whose raison d'etre derives from
the existence of disparate systems of law.
A final matter relating to conflicts of law under the ULIB is the
effect signatory states will give to judgements of other non-signatory states involving application of the ULIB. These matters would
necessarily involve issues of resjudicata and full faith and credit.
Since the Convention does not address these issues, they would be
left to the internal law of signatory states. Query whether a treaty
provision relating to these matters would have been advisable.
C. JudicialInterfpretation
Third Draft ULIB establishes interpretive guidelines for courts
trying cases under the Convention. 149 The adjudicatory model fol146. Openedforsignature June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 319 (entered intoforee Jan. 1, 1934).
147. See, e.g., ARLMINJON & CARRY, La Letre de Change et le Billet d'Ordre no. 430

(1938).
148. Dohm, supra note 62, at 479.
149. In the interpretation and application of this Law, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity.
Third Draft ULIB, supra note 11, art 4. See also First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 4,

commentary nos. 1 & 2.
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lows the path of past commercial law unification efforts' in that
national courts, not international tribunals, are expected to apply
the ULIB.
While the interpretive standard is noble and based on an ideal
of harmonious and concerted development of the law of international negotiable instruments, it is unrealistic - and probably ineffective - because of its vague imprimatur and its failure to consider
fundamental differences with respect to the role of national judiciaries in developing the jurisprudence of codified law.
The ULIB judicial standard, as reflected in Third Draft article
4, fails to carry out the aim of the working group in "promoting
uniformity in the interpretation and application"'' of the Convention. National courts will be free to utilize more familiar local concepts of negotiable instruments law as analogies in deciding cases,
without violating the letter of the article. This will lead to divisiveness and parochialism in addition to international precedent for a
court to look to its own negotiable instruments law in applying the
ULIB.
In a similar vein, the commentary to article 4 is ripe for semantical exploitation because of vagueness and weakness of language.
For example, the commentary to First Draft ULIB article 4 states
in part that "due regard for the international character of the law
would avoid interpreting its provisions by recourse to local (and
varying) national concepts."' 5 2 "Due regard" can be interpreted in
a number of ways by a reviewing court. Similarly, the phrase "national concepts" could be interpreted as referring to tenets of negotiable instruments law, traditions of judicial review, or even local
business practices. As another example, the First Draft ULIB commentary declares that "[t]his article may also be helpful to encourage tribunals in one State to promote uniformity by
interpreting the [I]aw with due regard to the interpretation given to
the [1]aw in other States."' 5 3 If the working group was intent on
bringing about a shared legal tradition under the ULIB, it would
150. See, e.g., Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, done July 1, 1964, [19721 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (Cmd. 5029), with Annex 1,Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 453 (1964).
151. Draft Uniform Law on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Work of Its Fourth Session (New
York, 2-12 Feb. 1976), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/CRP.10/Add. 4, art. 4, commentary no.
6.
152. First Draft ULIB, supra note 22, art. 4, commentary no. 2.
153. Id (emphasis added).
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have been more useful and straightforward to have established, or
specifically referred to, an international clearinghouse for local judicial opinions dealing with ULIB. Further, as noted above, the
phrase "due regard" is simply too amorphous to be of any practical
value to a reviewing court dealing with an international agreement.
The vagueness and unspecific language of article 4 and its
commentary are probably mere symptoms of a more fundamental
lack of appreciation for the great differences in the traditions of
legal review inherent in the various legal systems. Countries harboring a civil law tradition differ from the common law legal systems with respect to the role of the judiciary in interpreting
legislation. 5 4 Simply put, the common law has respected an
activist judicial stance and a flexible approach to statutory construction, while the civil - or code - legal tradition is much more
conservative in this regard.' 5 5 In addition, while the principies of
stare decisis and binding authority are manifest under the common
law, the civil law adherents feel less compunction to follow past
judicial precedent. 15 6 In striking out to achieve the ambitious goal
of uniformity in the interpretation and application of the ULIB, the
working group overlooked this vital legal distinction.
Perhaps more disturbing is the working group's expectation
that, without structure or encouragement, varying local tribunals in
one state will be able to purposefully advance ULIB jurisprudence
by looking to the interpretations given to the law in other states.
This expectation does not conform to reality. Courts in nations
having a common law background will tend to give greater regard
to other common law judicial opinions than to civil law opinions,
and vice versa. Indeed, tribunals in socialist countries will tend to
be more influenced by the decisions of sister socialist courts, and
most influenced by Soviet decisions. 57 Thus, as an illustration,
while the courts of New Zealand might feel comfortable in giving
"great weight" to the decisions of English courts, it is reasonable to
assume that they would not feel as sanguine with regard to French
opinions interpreting the ULIB. As a result, it would seem likely
154. See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 235-36, 434-42 (3d ed. 1971).
155. Id at 437. But see id at 438 (formulation of broad legislation construed as express
legislative authorization for the creation of decisional law which has all the earmarks of
common law).
156. SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 410, 436. See also Lipstein, The Doctrine of Precedent in Continental Law with Special Reference to French and German Law, 28 J. COMP. LEG.
& INT'L L. (3d ser.) 34 (1946).
157. SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 266-67.
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that varying precedential regard by assorted parochial tribunals
would have a disruptive and centrifugal effect on the development
of a uniform negotiable instruments law.
It is arguable that a better approach would have entailed a special international tribunal to administer and interpret the ULIB. 158
At the very least, a formal clearinghouse for judicial opinions or
provision for the submission of amicus curiae briefs would have
been in order.'59
II.

GENERAL PROBLEMS

After scrutinizing some of the specific problems of ULIB's
form and content, judicial interpretation, and conflict of laws provisions, certain general problems surface. These general problems
are not limited to the particular provisions discussed in this article;
rather, the general problem areas tend to characterize the entire
proposed Treaty.
A.

The "'Barebones"DraftingApproach

The work of UNCITRAL in drafting a uniform negotiable instruments law was profoundly affected by the "founding fathers" of
the unification movement: Messrs. Leary, Husted, and Yntema.
Leary and Husted advanced the "barebones" or "skeletal" thesis of
drafting an international commercial code in a 1949 article. 160 This
proposal suggested a restriction of the scope of unification to "the
relatively few questions. . . regarded as really indispensible for the
normal circulation of negotiable instruments."' 16 1 Yntema charac158. In the past, international tribunals have usually been constituted to deal with disputes between nation-states rather than between nationals of various countries. This trend,
however, has shown signs of receding in recent years. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into
force Oct 14, 1966). See generally H. STEIN & D. VAOTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PRoBLEMs 143-46, 209, 278, 282, 354-56, 360-63 (1968).
159. Dohm, supra note 62, at 488.
160. Leary & Husted, An Approach to Draftingan InternationalCommercialCode and a
Modus Operandi Under Present Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1070 (1949).
161. Yntema, Uncation of Laws Respecting Negotiable Instruments, 4 INTL L.Q. 178,
186 (1951). Yntema further elaborated on the thrust of the barebones approach by noting:
Consequently, this plan would leave the many intricate questions arising in case of
dishonour to be regulated by the various local laws, supplemented with respect to
specific conflicts in their possible application by international agreement on corresponding conflict rules. This conception, the essence of which is that efforts towards unification in this field should be limited to stating a central case of
uniformity necessary for international trade to be enacted as part of the domestic
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terized such an approach as "draconian" in his 1951 article, although he did note that such an approach seemed to have special
advantages as a basis for departure in dealing with the problem of
international unification of negotiable instruments law. Indeed, the
rationale of the Leary-Husted-Yntema approach was that it was
"politically practical." These political considerations surrounding
162
unification were summarized in a 1970 UNCITRAL report
which expounded on the conclusions of a 1955 subcommission of
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) chaired by Professor Yntema.
The problem of international unification with respect to negotiable instruments was approached in a very realistic manner at the
Sub-Commission's meetings.
Any hope of persuading the common-law countries to adopt
the Geneva Uniform Law, even as an optional law applicable
only to international instruments, was set aside. That was a forelegislation in each country, contemplates that international agreement as respects
international documents should be secured concerning the following1. The formal requisites of negotiability.
2. The normal, but not unusual, modes of transfer.
3. The liability arising upon indorsement without disclaimer ....
4. The proceedings necessary to charge secondary parties upon dishonour.
In other words, this plan proposes that uniformity in the laws respecting negotiable
instruments should be limited to those matters, and those matters only, which are
indispensible for the use of the common commercial instruments in the normal
course of international trade, unusual or local types of documents, atypical
problems or practices, and, in particular, the questions eventuating when the ordinary circumstance of a negotiable instrument has been interrupted by dishonour,
all these should be excluded. These, it is conceived, should be determined by the
applicable national laws and not thrust upon a Procrustean bed of uniformity that
would vainly seek to change long standing local practices.
id.at 186-87. For discussion of various philosophies of the international unification of law in
general, see I. SzAsz, A UNIFORM LAW ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 15-30 (1976)
(philosophy of unification of trade laws); UNIFICATION OF THE LAW GOVERNING INTERNA-

TIONAL SALES OF GOODS (J. Honnald ed. 1966); R. GRAVESON, ONE LAW (1977).
162. See I UNCITRAL, supra note 4, at 239-42. The Subcommission came to five basic
conclusions about the prospects for unifying negotiable instruments law:
1. It is very difficult to draw up a uniform law which Would be applied as municipal law in the common-law countries.
2. It is very difficult, in international transactions, to persuade the common-law
countries to accept the full text of the Geneva law.
3. An effort must therefore be made to establish a body of rules aimed at solving
the most urgent problems in the field of international negotiable instruments.
4. These rules would be less numerous than those of the laws now in force. They
would regulate a strictly international negotiable instrument which might serve at
the same time as a bill of exchange and as a cheque, the regulation of promissory
notes being set aside for the present.
5. The rules thus established would be purely optional, the parties concerned being free to adopt the new international instrument or the instruments now in use,
which would continue to be regulated by the applicable municipal law.

Id at 241.
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gone conclusion, in view of all the past experience in connection
with unification in that field.
In point of fact, the international unification in question
raised not only a legal problem but also a very delicate political
problem, both internationally and domestically, firstly because
every State is always somewhat reluctant to sign agreements
which may limit the sphere of validity of its national laws, and,
secondly, because the reaction of the circles concerned (banks,
merchants, industrialists) exercises a very strong influence for or
against movements towards international unification, especially
in the case of a subject such as a bill of exchange. It is a widely
recognized fact that the Anglo-American circles concerned have
never been particularly sympathetic towards the Geneva Uniform Law, for they consider it too detailed and complicated, as
Professor Yntema and Lord Chorley observed during the debate
in the Sub-Commission. On the other hand, the countries which
have adopted the Geneva Uniform Laws cannot be expected to
favour any amendment of them, which would inevitably have
repercussions on banking and commercial practice.
Consequently, as all the members of the Sub-Commission
observed, the problem of unification consists essentially of defining the limits of unification with regard to the content of the uniform law to be drawn up. As stated in the Sub- Commission'sfinal
report, this law should be simple and contain as few rules as
possible.
Clearly, the uniform interpretationandapplicationby courts in
the various countriesofa seriesof spartanrules. . . would give rise
to less serious dfliculties than might be encounteredin the case ofa
comprehensive and would-be systematic law-a law which, as such,
it would be much more diffcult to divorcefrom
the juridicalenvi163
ronment and traditionsin which it originated.

What is disturbing from the standpoint of contemporary unification efforts is the adoption of the barebones approach by UNCITRAL with relatively little policy debate. Indeed, the UNCITRAL
Yearbook reference supra represents the single major published
discussion of negotiable instrument unification strategies since the
work of the 1955 UNIDROIT Subcommission. Several possible
deficiencies in the "barebones approach" should have been examined by UNCITRAL before drafting of the ULIB commenced.
First, it is arguable that due to the inevitable regional and legal
163. Id at 241-42 (emphasis added).
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system biases of the Convention participants, the barebones approach was impractical from the start. It was only realistic to expect a "jockeying" for position among the Convention delegates to
maximize the specific provisions of parochial negotiable instruments law-that would be reflected in the final Treaty, and to minimize specific provisions of alien systems. In the end, this is precisely
what happened: some provisions of the proposed Treaty are elaborate and have dealt with detailed legal questions which theoretically fall outside the scope of a barebones approach, while other
provisions have been excessively curt and sparing in the detail necessary for enlightened judicial interpretation.
Second, the philosophical premise of "ease of judicial interpretation," advanced by barebones advocates, seems deficient. It is arguable that national courts, when left with little guiding detail, will
look to their own local law and legal traditions to supply the
missing gaps. Moreover, even if this point is conceded, and it is
assumed that local courts would seek an "international" context for
their decisions, a practical question arises: how is a uniform interpretation and application of ULIB to be achieved? Realistically,
courts will tend to utilize familiar local concepts of legislative interpretation, precedent, and the role of the judiciary. This, in turn,
will lead to disjointed, nonuniform interpretation. It seems that a
much stronger case could have been made for the proposition that
explicit, comprehensive substantive guidelines would foster uniform interpretation of the Convention. Indeed, it is tempting to
conclude that UNCITRAL begged the question: the underlying rationale for the barebones approach appears to have been
exclusively political.
Finally, the barebones approach misread Anglo-American
hesitancy in altering the BEA-U.C.C. paradigm. Anglo-American
traditionalists were justifiably upset in changing the law relating to
international bills and notes. However, in light of the optional nature of ULIB in each negotiable instrument transaction and the
built-in legal provision that the Convention's rules would apply
only where multinational contacts were established, it seems an
overstatement to have concluded that a common, detailed convention for international bills and notes would not be desirable in
nations utilizing Anglo-American negotiable instruments law. Indeed, since international banks having offices in nations of the Anglo-American orbit are expected to be the primary users of the
ULIB, there are clear benefits that would have accrued from an
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optional, detailedlaw applicable to multinational negotiable instruments transactions.
B. The Choice Mechanism
The ULIB is an optional law that parties may choose to use or
not to use. As with all options, parties will calculate the benefits
and the risks of utilizing the international scheme versus the benefits and risks of a local negotiable instruments law. However, the
ULIB gives no practical incentives for a drawer or maker to choose
the international Convention over a domestic system. Local systems with substantial bodies of judicial interpretation would seem
to provide more security for parties than the untested and uninterpreted broad provisions of the ULIB. This conclusion is buttressed
by the fact that a number of replies given by banks and governments to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General stated that the
existing local laws operate satisfactorily and the divergencies between the civil and common law systems are mainly of academic
importance and are not a serious impediment to international payments by means of local negotiable instruments law."6 Alternatively, since a majority of replies to the questionnaire mentioned
certain problems that were encountered in the use of negotiable instruments in international transactions,1 65 to the extent that parties
perceive these problems to be major, as opposed to minor, coupled
with their conclusion that ULIB has provided solutions to the major problems, the ULIB will be chosen. A major problem in the
164. See id at 243-56. See also MEZNERICS, supra note 4, at 242.
165. Meznerics provides an excellent summary of these problems as tabulated by UNCITRAL:
These problems are said to have risen in the following contexts: (a) The effect of
statements in the instrument, such as references to an underlying contract. (b) The
effect of the term non-negotiable written on the instrument. (c) Deviations from the
traditional handwritten signature in drawing, accepting or endorsing an instrument.
(d) Bills of exchange payable by instalments. (e) Failure to insert the term 'bill of
exchange' in the body of the instrument. (On this point there is an important difference between the rules of the two principal systems). (f) Stipulation of interest.
(The Geneva rules set forth restrictions on provision for interest that are not found
in the Anglo-American law). (g) Rights and liabilities of the parties. (h) Forged
signatures and endorsements; alterations. (i) Lost instruments. (j) Protest and notice of dishonour. (Under the law of certain countries protest is a prerequisite to
legal action against the acceptor, and not only in the case of recourse. In addition,
where an aval has been given for the acceptor, it is not always clear whether protest
is necessary if the holder wishes to take legal action against the grantor for nonpayment on the part of the acceptor. The absence of uniform rules with regard to
theprocedual consequences ofprolest ofdishonour gives rise to certain practical and
legal difficulties in recovery actions. Many replies favour simplification of the form
and formalities of protest.
MEZNERICS, supra note 4, at 242 (original emphasis).
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choice of ULIB, however, is the inertia that persists in international
banking circles in favor of local negotiable instrument laws. Bankers might find it unrealistic to utilize the ULIB in all international
transactions; also, developing a strategy for choosing which international transactions should be subject to ULIB might prove costly.
Moreover, since the ULIB does not explicitly address electronic
funds transfers (EFT's), a substantial number of international paybanks via
ments transactions now conducted by international
66
1
ULIB.
the
of
ambit
the
outside
fall
EFT's will
An unanswered policy issue of broad dimensions is the eventuality of a few major international banks choosing ULIB, while
other major international banks persist in the use of local negotiable instruments law. Query whether it will be detrimental to international banking to have such a "multi-layered" approach.
C

Methodology Criticisms

Several comments on the conception and process of the ULIB,
by UNCITRAL, are in order. First, the raison d'etre
conducted
as
of the Convention's entire substantive scheme - the questionnaire
of the Secretary-General - failed to take into consideration the
financial power of the various respondents in analyzing responses.
For example, equal weight seems to have been accorded to both the
responses of United States government and institutional reactions,
on the one hand, and African governments and institutions, on the
other hand. While such an approach is commendable from an
egalitarian perspective, it is unrealistic in light of the great differences in financial influence wielded by these nations.'6 7
166.

See Scott, 7he Rik Fixers, 91 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1978) for a discussion of some

novel legal problems presented by the emergence of new electronic payments systems. Professor Scott examines the emergence of the first banking code in order to explain why private
contract did not develop to govern payment transactions. He suggests that domestic commercial statutes have been less embodiments of the law merchant than devices for allocating
risks among transactors. Based on this historical analysis, Scott identifies several factors
present in the now payment systems which may lead to the adoption of new risk-fixing legislation.
In light of Scott's analysis of domestic negotiable instruments law, it is arguable that the
working group should have given greater thought to allocating the risks of electronic funds

transfers in the international realm.
167. Perhaps this problem is intractable, given the current militancy of the "group of 77"
within the United Nations. It should be noted, however, that the United Nations would not
have sacrificed egalitarian goals by placing more emphasis on the responses of the financially
influential nations and institutions, since the ULIB is purely a commercial Treaty and its
success will be determined by the reaction of the major financial powers to its provisions.
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Second, the various reports and drafts of UNCITRAL, the
ULIB working group, and the ULIB drafting committee reflect a
frequent lack of coordination between these groups, in addition to
unnecessary duplication of effort. Related to the above criticism is
the relatively sparse meeting schedule which has accompanied an
eleven year drafting effort. It is arguable that the working group
should have held a series of intense meetings over a number of
months, rather than meet just a few times a year for only days at a
time. However, because the major participants in the drafting effort are engaged in numerous other academic commitments, perhaps the elongated time schedule was a necessary evil.
Finally, it is necessary to question why the ULIB drafters ignored the complex issues of electronic funds transfers, which have
come to affect the international payments system to such a great
degree. In essence, the ULIB is a reconsideration of the ancient
theories of bills of exchange and promissory notes. It is debatable
whether such a scheme, rooted in the past, will be able to accomo68
date modem problems of international banking.
D.

The Commentary

A major criticism of the intellectual integrity of the barebones
approach is a tendency manifested by the working group to deal
with ambiguities inherent in the ULIB text by resort to lengthy interpretation in the commentary. While several examples exist, the
case of article 10 is illustrative. As noted above,169 article 10 provides for the relatively uncommon case when a bill involves multiple persons of the same category. Article 10 provides a rule for the
consequences of multiplicity of payees by stating that
if an instrument is payable to two or more payees in the alternative, it is payable to any one of them and any one of them in
possession of the instrument may exercise the rights of the
holder. In any other case the instrument is payable to all of them
and the rights of the holder can be exercised by all of them. 7 °
At the Fifth Session of the working group, a question was raised
about whether the above rule adequately dealt with the bill in the
form "Pay to 4 and/or B the sum of. . ." " After some discussion it was decided not to change the language of paragraph 3 of
168.
169.
170.
171.

See note 166 supra, and accompanying text.
See note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
Id art. 10(3).
Id art. 10(3), commentary no. 27.
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article 10, but rather to make clear in the commentary that the ambiguous payee form "A and/or B" would not be an instruction to
pay either A or B in the alternative, and therefore would require
the concurrence of both A and B to exercise any rights of the
holder.' 7 2 Furthermore, the purported barebones approach - not
unduly burdening the Convention with complex provisions to deal
with any contingency - has been inconsistently followed. For example, the working group, at its Fifth Session, made amendments
to article 9 provisions dealing with the form requisites of an instrument bearing a direction to pay on demand or at a definite time,
which changes can quite readily be labelled complex and directed
73
at resolving lingering ambiguities in the article.
A second problem with the commentary is whether it has any
legal effect at all. Unlike the U.C.C., for example, no statement of
the legal effect is given within the ULIB, and courts would have to
decide for themselves what effect and weight to give to the commentary. This problem, in turn, raises another problem: will all
courts, without direction, give equal weight to the commentary?
Indeed, it is questionable what provision UNCITRAL will make
for distributing copies of the final commentary and the earlier draft
commentaries.
172. Unpublished Report of Professor Norman Penney to the United States Department
of State (1977), at 20-21 (copy on file with Calfornia Western InternationalLaw Journal).
173. Professor Penney's unpublished State Department report notes:
At the suggestion of one member of the working group a provision, like Article 35
of the Geneva Law was added "to regulate maturity in the case of an instrument
p yable at a fixed period after sight." Added to paragraph (4) was the sentence:
The maturity of a bill payable at a fixed period after sight is determined by the
date of the acceptance."
Pending further inquiries as to usage of notes payable at a fixed period after
sight, the working group provisionally adopted a bracked provision as follows:
[The maturity of a note payable at a fixed period after sight is determined by
the date of the visa signed by the maker on the note or, if signature be refused, from
the date of presentment.]
Finally a new paragraph (5) is to be inserted in Article 9 to provide a rule for
instruments payable a number of months after date or sight. Following Article 36
of the Geneva Law, the new provisions state that:
Where an instrument is drawn or made payable at one or more months after a
stated date or after the date of the instrument or after sight, the instrument matures
on the corresponding date of the month when payment must be made. If there be
no corresponding date, the instrument matures on the last day of that month.
Id at 18-19.
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LAW JOURNAL

AN ASSESSMENT: JUDGING THE
IMPRESSIONS

ULIB

Vol. 9

BY FIRST

There are four objectives by which any proposed unification of
negotiable instruments law should be judged: (1) it should be generally acceptable. Any new international negotiable instruments law
should be acceptable to international bankers, government officials,
international businesspersons, and local judges. A system that is
disliked by any of these groups would encounter substantial political opposition, and, if instituted, would be hampered by a lack of
cooperation; (2) it should be easily administered. The administration of an international negotiable instruments law should not require complex procedures that are costly and inconvenient or
permit arbitrary decisions. The basic text of the law should be
widely available, as should the legislative history and interpretive
provisions; (3) it shouldaddress majorproblemswith sufficient detail.
Any negotiable instruments law which fails to solve major
problems as perceived by major financial powers would be superfluous. Further, a scheme which does not elucidate sufficient detail
will tend to discourage parties from using the scheme because of
uncertainty in how courts would interpret the provisions; and (4) it
should be subject to a supreme tribunal. Any international negotiable instruments law which fails to provide for a final interpretation
will suffer from devisive interpretation. This, in turn, will lead to
uncertainty and will discourage use, or alternatively promote forum
shopping in those jurisdictions where favorable interpretation to
one's status (as drawer, maker, payee, or drawee) abound.
Applying the above benchmarks to the form and content,
choice of law, and judicial interpretation provisions of the proposed
ULIB yields the following conclusions.
First, all of the substantive provisions are generally acceptable.
This is due in large part to the optional feature of the Convention
and the fact that long, painstaking, and repetitive review of the provisions has taken place.
Second, the proposed ULIB, as contemplated by Third Draft
article 2, will be easily administered. Parties will be able to sue in
local courts where civil procedure rules are familiar. However, this
apparent feature of convenience for the plaintiff could prove quite
inconvenient to a defendant in a foreign land several thousand
miles away. Had article 3 provided a rule offorum non conveniens
and, perhaps, removal to a signatory jurisdiction midway between
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the adversaries, administration might have been improved. It is
questionable, however, whether all local courts will have access to
the ULIB. UNCITRAL should endeavor to distribute all documents relevant to ULIB, including judicial decisions, to key libraries in all countries of the world.
The proposed ULIB addresses the problems as indicated by
the Secretary-General's survey, but often fails to provide sufficient
detail. This is largely a result of the barebones drafting approach
adopted by UNCITRAL. It is questionable whether the barebones
approach was well conceived and sufficiently debated before its
wholesale acceptance. Moreover, many of the substantive details of
the form and content provisions are relegated to the commentary
where their legal effect is questionable.
Finally, article 2 fails to provide for a supreme interpretation
of ULIB's provisions. Local courts are given discretion to apply the
broad terms of the Treaty and are subject only to the internal review process of their respective jurisdictions. Perhaps this deficiency is mitigated by the fact that the judicial decisions of the
major financial nations will probably be given greater weight and
importance, and judicial aberrations of the relatively unimportant
tribunals discounted. However, query whether this defeats one of
the purposes of the unification of law.
In conclusion, this assessment can only be of limited value in
judging the proposed ULIB since it focuses on but three substantive
areas. However, because these substantive areas are of general importance to the success of the other, more narrow, provisions of the
proposed Convention, the evaluation should be carefully studied by
counsel to international banks and international businesses.
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